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Gaucher disease (GD) is a rare and chronic, genetic disorder which presents immensely challenging 
ethical dilemmas for patients and families. Important is the high-cost, high-benefit, but low volume 
treatment for Gaucher disease, which creates incessant resource allocation dilemmas for healthcare 
professionals and policy makers and lack of access to care for patients. Apart from expenditure, 
Gaucher disease provokes numerous other ethical dilemmas including genetic screening, disclosure of 
genetic information and abortion. These issues pose important social and ethical challenges to the 
discipline of biomedical ethics. This study seeks to interrogate some of these burning ethical 
dilemmas. By means of a fictional biomedical ethics case report which deals with a pregnant patient 
subsequently diagnosed with the rare Gaucher disease, it simulates and highlights some of the 
numerous ethical dilemmas that a pregnant Type 1 Gaucher disease patient may have to ultimately 
contend with. This study will attempt to illuminate ideas of ring fencing resources for patients with 
rare or orphan diseases in a resource restricted developing country like South Africa.  It will also 
attempt to provide some guidance when dealing with some of the other burning ethical issues related 









Gaucher siekte (GS) is a seldsame en kroniese genetiese siektetoestand wat uiters uitdagende etiese 
dilemmas vir pasiënte en hul families kan veroorsaak. Van besondere belang vir pasiënte, lede van die 
mediese professie, sowel as beleidskeppers, is die hoë koste, hoë voordeel, maar lae volume 
behandeling vir Gaucher siekte wat onvermydelike dilemmas veral met betrekking tot veral die 
toekenning van finansiële hulpbronne kan veroorsaak. Bo-en-behalwe dié uitgawes, ontketen Gaucher 
siekte verskeie ander etiese dilemmas, insluitend genetiese- toetsing en skandering, die bekendmaking 
van genetiese inligting, asook aborsie. Hierdie dilemmas kan belangrike sosiale en etiese uitdagings 
vir die vakgebied biomediese etiek teweegbring. Die tesis ondersoek sommige van die mees algemene 
etiese dilemmas. Deur middel van ‘n fiktiewe biomediese en etiese gevallestudie met betrekking tot ‘n 
swanger pasiënt gediagnoseer met die seldsame Gaucher siekte, word verskeie etiese dilemmas, 
waarmee ‘n swanger pasiënt, wat gediagnoseer is met tipe 1 Gaucher siekte,  moontlik gekonfronteer 
kan word, aangeraak. Hierdie studie poog om, veral in ‘n ontwikkelende land soos Suid-Afrika met 
beperkte hulpbronne , nuwe idees uit te lig wat moontlik finansiële bronne beskikbaar kan stel vir 
pasiënte met seldsame of  wees siektetoestande. Die studie sal ook poog om verdere riglyne te verskaf 
aangaande ander kwellende etiese dilemmas wat moontlik mag gepaardgaan met Gaucher siekte soos 
genetiese toetsing, die bekendmaking van genetiese inligting, asook aborsie. 
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Gaucher disease literature review 
“Nothing important comes with Instructions.” – James Richardson, “Vectors 3.0” 
 
1. Introduction 
“Gaucher disease, a rare”, chronic, “genetic disease” (Hughes D. , 2015, p. 584) poses 
thought-provoking ethical dilemmas, both for patients and families. Of special significance is 
the resource allocation dilemma for patients and policy makers due to the high cost of 
treatment in the context of limited resources. Apart from expenditure, Gaucher disease 
provokes various other ethical dilemmas for healthcare professionals and patients regarding 
genetic screening, disclosure of genetic information and abortion (Gross, 2002). Chapter 1 
defines a rare disease and presents a Gaucher disease case study, as an example of a rare 
disease. This will be followed by background information regarding Gaucher disease and will 
include aspects regarding diagnosis, disease severity, mortality and morbidity, and physical, 
physiological, as well as social consequences. Subsequently, some of the ethical dilemmas 
associated with Gaucher disease such as genetic screening and resource allocation are 
described and explored in more detail. 
 
2. Definitions of a rare disease 
“There are an estimated 6 000 to 8 000 rare diseases” (De Vrueh R. , 2014, p. 4). Most rare 
diseases “are of genetic origin and affect children at a very early age” (De Vrueh R. , 2014, p. 
4). Gaucher disease belongs to such a cluster of rare diseases (De Vrueh R. , 2013, pp. 6.19-
5) (Tambuyzer, 2010, p. 921). The definition of what constitutes as a rare disease vary 
between continents (Rosenberg-Yunger, 2011). The USA defines a rare disease or condition 
as “affecting fewer than 200 000 patients (6,4 per 10 000 inhabitants)” (Drummond, 2014, p. 
335) while the European Union defines it as “a prevalence of 5 per 10 000 or lower” 
(Drummond, 2014, p. 335) and the United Kingdom (UK) a prevalence of less than 1 in 
50 000 per population (Drummond, 2014, p. 335) (Dani, 2013, p. 220).   
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According to the World Health Organisation, the prevalence lies somewhere between 6,5 and 
10 patients in 10 000 (Aronson, 2006, p. 243). It is estimated that “one person out of 15 could 
be affected by a rare disease” globally, which “represents 400 million people worldwide of 
which 30 million are Europeans and 25 million Americans” (De Vrueh R. , 2013, pp. 6.19-5). 
However, rare diseases affect people globally and therefore represent a true global health 
issue. Rare diseases are sometimes referred to as “health orphans”, because insufficient 
evidence exists about their origins and “effective therapies are limited” (Remuzzi, 2008, p. 
1978) (Tambuyzer, 2010, p. 921).  
 
Living with a rare disease is challenging, as there is often limited treatment, or the disease 
may be poorly understood by both researchers and clinicians, as well as by family members 
and the broader community (Kesselheim, 2015, p. 75). Patients with rare diseases often have 
difficulties in finding expert medical care, which may lead to “a sense of isolation” (Field, 
2010, p. 69) and “lack of support” (Field, 2010, p. 69) (Kesselheim, 2015, p. 76). The 
“financial and social burdens they bear, combined with the limited availability of treatments” 
(Field, 2010, p. 69) “converge creating a willingness to accept risks in their care in the hopes 
of finding a benefit” (Kesselheim, 2015, p. 76).  
 
Medicines indicated for these life-threatening or seriously debilitating diseases, are also aptly 
called ‘orphan drugs’ due to the high costs of medicine development, the rarity of diseases 
and uncertain benefit (Dani, 2013, p. 221). In the US, 400 of these products have made it to 
the market (Paulden, 2015, p. 255), (De Vrueh R. , 2014, p. 1) (Tambuyzer, 2010, p. 921) 
(Divino, 2016, p. 1) (Da Silva, 2015, p. 500) (Gong, 2016, p. 4). The Orphanet Drug Report 
(October 2015: 5), demonstrates that “the number of US orphan medicine designations 
increased by 12% to 291 in 2014 and rose an incredible 62% to 201 in 2014 in Europe” 
(Hadjivalisou, 2015, p. 5). Similarly, Hanna et al reported a considerable increase in the 
cumulative total of marketing authorisations in the EU from 1995 to 2015 for medicines 
intended for the treatment of rare diseases (Hanna, 2016, p. 113).  
 
Even though these treatments have made a huge difference to patient’s lives, “expense is a 
large consideration in the treatment” (Wang, 2011, p. 459) of rare diseases, especially since 
medicine expenses can become rapidly exhausted because health insurance may be limited to 
a maximum amount covered in a lifetime (Wang, 2011, p. 459) with most of the available 
therapies (Wang, 2011, p. 459) (Menon, 2015, p. 117). 




3. A case study 
The following discussion is a fictional biomedical ethics case report: 
Mrs. X is a 28-year old black female patient, who consulted the nurse at a rural clinic for a 
slight fever, weakness and pallor coinciding with a swollen stomach and suspected 
pregnancy. Over the past few years she had recurrent episodes of fever and respiratory 
infections. She had received unspecified medications for the recurrent respiratory tract 
infections. She had also visited traditional healers on quite a few occasions.  
Mrs. X suffers from chronic bone pain, sometimes excruciatingly intense. When the patient 
cuts herself, she bleeds quite profusely, and also has unexpected severe nose bleeds. The 
patient has had two miscarriages in the last 3 years. She was referred to the Steve Biko 
Tertiary Hospital where they conducted an ultrasound which confirmed that she was 12 
weeks pregnant. She also presented with a grossly enlarged spleen (splenomegaly) and an 
enlarged liver (hepatomegaly) to 3 cm below the costal margin. Concerned with the protruded 
abdomen, the investigating physician decided to investigate alternate reasons for the enlarged 
spleen and liver. Malaria was suspected but ruled out through appropriate blood tests.  
To evaluate massive splenomegaly, bone marrow aspiration was performed which revealed 
Gaucher cells in a background of normal erythroid, myeloid and megakaryocytic lineage 
cells. Bone marrow tests showed marked hyper cellular marrow, diffuse sheets of abnormal 
infiltrate comprised of macrophages with profuse pale staining cytoplasm with a texture of 
crushed paper/silk, suggestive of inherited lysosomal storage disease. A dried blood spot 
(DBS) test demonstrated low activity of beta-glucosidase (36 pmol/spot with reference value 
of 200-2 000 pmol/spot), which was very low.  
 
According to Li et al, an enzyme blood spot test is a reliable, fast and simple, inexpensive and 
minimally invasive way of testing for Gaucher disease (Li, 2010, p. 49). 
Other diagnostic procedures conducted on the patient included the following: Full blood 
count which revealed low red blood cell counts and low platelet counts. Quality of life 
assessments indicated that the patient was suffering from considerable fatigue. X-rays 
revealed osteopenia and a DEXA assessment further revealed low bone density. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
11 
 
Mrs. X was subsequently diagnosed as a Gaucher disease type 1 patient. Tragically, despite 
the fact that the patient visited clinics and hospitals habitually for bone pain, and also pallor 
(which could have been tested by means of full blood count (FBC)), as well as numerous 
respiratory tract infections, she was never fully investigated for Gaucher disease.  According 
to Mistry et al, delayed diagnosis after onset of symptoms prevents nearly one in four patients 
timely access to therapy (Mistry, 2011, p. 110). 
In an ideal world, regular ongoing tests should be conducted at diagnosis and then at regular 
intervals thereafter. However, due to cost and other constraints, many patients do not receive 
regular ongoing check-ups, which might assist in assessing the patient’s progress or deter 
deterioration. 
The following comprises of a literature review relevant to Type 1 Gaucher disease. 
 
 
4. What is Gaucher Disease? 
4.1 Background 
“Gaucher disease is the most common lysosomal storage disorder” (Wang, 2011, p. 464) and 
is classified as a rare disease (Bhengu, 2011, p. 697). Gaucher disease is divided into three 
different clinical types, of which type 1 is the “most common” (Cassinerio, 2014, p. 118), 
while type 3 and type 2 comprise of 5% and 1%, respectively (Bhengu, 2011, p. 697) (Di 
Rocco, 2014, p. 1905). “In the early 1990’s, Gaucher disease was the first of the lysosomal 
storage disorders that could be treated successfully with enzyme replacement therapy” (De 
Fost, 2006, p. 830). 
“Philippe Charles Ernest Gaucher described Gaucher disease in 1882” (Packman, 2010, p. 
2002). Gaucher annotated this disorder, which led to the death of a “32-year old woman” 
(Baris, 2014, p. 73) that presented with massive hepatosplenomegaly, abnormal histiocytes 
and cachexia (Grabowski, 2014, p. 10).  Gaucher diagnosed a splenic neoplasm in his patient 
(Mistry, 2015, p. S6). Often at the time of diagnosis, Gaucher disease is easily  confused with 
a malignancy  (Mistry, 2015, p. S6).   
 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
12 
 
Following this particular case, “no further reports emerged until 1895 when sporadic case 
reports of similar patients began” (Mistry, 2015, p. S7) to surface (Mandelbaum, 1912, p. 
797). “Mandelbaum, a physician from New York” (Mistry, 2007, p. S7), named the disease 
“Gaucher disease” and further “expanded the description of the morphologic pathology and 
anatomy of the disease” (Mistry, 2015, p. S7). 
Type 1 Gaucher disease affects “45 000-60 000 people” (Weinreb N. , 2012, p. 3) globally in 
the general population, but prevalence is seemingly higher with about 1 in 500 to 800 
Ashkenazi Jews affected (Weinreb N. , 2012, p. 3). “Approximately 1 in every 12 to 15 
people of Ashkenazi descent are carriers of Type 1 Gaucher disease” (Gauchercare, 2016). 
Morar et al estimated the disease “frequency of Gaucher disease in the Ashkenazim of South 
Africa” (Morar, 1996, p. 78) to be approximately 1 in 20 (Morar, 1996, p. 78). Gaucher Type 
1 disease “represents around 90% of all cases of Gaucher disease” (Weinreb N. , 2012, p. 3) 
“with an estimated prevalence of 1/40 000 in the general population” (Wang, 2011, p. 464) 
(Scriver, 2006, p. 12). 
In South Africa, “Gaucher disease has been demonstrated to occur in all ethnic groups” 
(Bhengu, 2011, p. 697). Various studies have also reported occurrence in both South African 
Afrikaans-speaking Caucasians, as well as in the South African Black population (Morar, 
1996, p. 78) (Arndt, 2009, p. 129) (Goldblatt, 1979, p. 209) (Patel, 1984, p. 343). Arndt et al 
noted that “only type 1” (Arndt, 2009, p. 132) Gaucher disease “has been reported in black 
South Africans” (Arndt, 2009, p. 132), and they have different gene mutations, while the 
disease is also clinically severe (Arndt, 2009, p. 129). Most of these patients “presented with 
severe hepatosplenomegaly and a combination of anaemia, cytopenia and leucopenia” (Arndt, 
2009, p. 129). 
The previously discussed case study, dealing with a pregnant patient subsequently diagnosed 
with the rare Gaucher disease, aptly demonstrated some of the ethical dilemmas that a 
pregnant Type 1 Gaucher disease patient might have to contend with, such as autonomy of 
the mother on the one hand versus justification for selective abortion on medical grounds and 









Gaucher disease refers to a “rare autosomal recessive” (Di Rocco, 2014, p. 1905) congenital 
“genetic deficiency of the lysosomal enzyme ß-glucocerebrosidase” (Di Rocco, 2014, p. 
1905). This disorder impairs storage of glucocerebroside and other glycolipids in various 
tissues leading to injury of “several organ systems” (Di Rocco, 2014, p. 1905) (Patel, 1984, p. 
343).  
According to Arndt et al, “type 1 Gaucher disease” (Arndt, 2009, p. 129) is most commonly 
triggered by an alteration in “the GBA gene (localized to 1q21) that codes for the lysosomal 
enzyme, glucocerebrosidase” (Arndt, 2009, p. 129) (Bhengu, 2011, p. 697). 
 
Rosenbaum et al mention that “the course of Type 1 Gaucher disease is” (Rosenbaum, 2015, 
p. S49) typically diverse with wide-ranging clinical manifestations and numerous different 
stages of disease severity (Rosenbaum, 2015, p. 549). This “clinical heterogeneity which 
marks Gaucher disease is partially attributable to the more than 100 mutations within the 
glucocerebrosidase gene” (Elstein, 1998, p. 179). “The deficiency in glucocerebrosidase leads 
to the accumulation of glucosylceramides (or beta-glucocerebrosidase) deposits in the cells of 
the reticuloendothelial system of the liver, of the spleen and the bone marrow (Gaucher 
cells)” (Rosenbaum, 2015, p. S49). In Gaucher “types 2 and 3, pathology also occurs within 








The transmission of Gaucher disease is “autosomal recessive” (Di Rocco, 2014, p. 1905) 
(Bhengu, 2011, p. 698). This implies that both parents of an affected person are carriers of a 
mutated acid ß-glucosidase gene. Thus, “a person develops Type 1 Gaucher disease if he or 
she inherits two defective copies of this gene (one from each parent)” (Gauchercare, 2016).  
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“If a person only inherits one defective copy, he or she will not develop Type 1 Gaucher 
disease, but is considered a ‘carrier’.” A carrier can pass the defective gene to his or her 
children. With each pregnancy, each carrier has a 50% chance of passing on the defective 
gene. If both parents are carriers, there is a 25% chance their child will inherit two defective 
copies and will develop Type 1 Gaucher disease” (Gauchercare, 2016).  
Figure 1.1: Inheriting Gaucher disease (adapted from http://www.cerezyme.com/patients/gaucher_disease.aspx) 






C=Carrier (of Gaucher disease) 
 
The chart (figure 1.1) shows how a patient with Gaucher disease when procreating with a 
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Diagnosis of rare diseases remains a challenge and many patients visit an average of 7,5 
physicians before receiving a definitive diagnosis. Even in the best possible circumstances, a 
percentage of patients will remain undiagnosed (Honey, 2016).  
A patient with Gaucher disease, which is progressive and chronic, often remains undiagnosed 
(Mistry, 2007, p. 679). “Diagnosis of Gaucher disease is based on history, clinical evaluation, 
laboratory investigations and diagnostic imaging” (Bhengu, 2011, p. 697). According to the 
South African Guidelines for management of Gaucher disease, it is apparent that some 
baseline assessments need to be conducted: “history, including family pedigree, medical 
history of bone involvement” (Bhengu, 2011, p. 697), infections, history of bruising, blood 
transfusions and nose bleeds (Bhengu, 2011, p. 697). 
 
Diagnostic methods often also involve ultrasound for organ measurement and “cardiac 
ultrasound for the detection of pulmonary arterial hypertension” (Wang, 2011, p. 464). 
“Magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) is utilised for the initial evaluation and subsequent 
monitoring of hepatosplenomegaly” (Wang, 2011, p. 464). Other diagnostic measures include 
“radiography and bone scintigraphy to detect bone lesions and complications” (Wang, 2011, 
p. 464), as well as “osteodensitometry for evaluation of osteopenia of the lumbar spine and 
femoral neck” (Wang, 2011, p. 464). An increase in certain “biological markers” (Wang, 
2011, p. 464), that are important both for the initial diagnosis and monitoring with or without 
treatment, is also observed such as “chitotriosidase, angiotensin converting enzyme, ferritin 
and tartrate-resistant acid phosphatases” (Wang, 2011, p. 464).  Diagnosis can be confirmed 
by demonstrating a deficit in the “enzymatic activity of glucocerebrosidase” (Wang, 2011, p. 
464). “In rare cases, genotyping may be of prognostic value: a patient with a homozygous 
N370S mutation in the GBA gene will not develop neurological disease” (Belmatoug, 2012).  
“Differential diagnoses include other lysosomal storage disorders. The presence of Gaucher-
like cells can be found in certain hematologic diseases (lymphoma, Hodgkin's lymphoma and 
chronic lymphocytic leukemia)” (Wang, 2011, p. 465) (Belmatoug, 2012).  
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Gaucher disease can be diagnosed at any age. “The first ICGG Gaucher Registry publication 
involved 1 698 patients” (Charrow, 2000, p. 2835), ranging “from infancy to older than 90 
years” (Mistry, 2015, p. S7). This emphasises the paediatric component of type 1 Gaucher 
disease, since almost “half of the 94% of patients” (Charrow, 2000, p. 2837) participating “in 
the disease registry were diagnosed before the age of 10” (Charrow, 2000, p. 2835). Lack of 
“diagnosis and treatment of Gaucher type 1 disease” (Weinreb N. , 2008, p. 890) may result 
in visceral, haematological and skeletal damage that decrease life expectancy (Weinreb N. , 
2008, p. 890). Progression tends to be more abrupt “in patients with early onset type 1 
Gaucher disease” (Bhengu, 2011, p. 697) (Martins, 2009, p. S10).  
Undiagnosed does not mean un-suffered, and therefore early diagnosis is essential to 
minimise organ damage through early treatment initiation with a subsequent reduction in 
mortality, morbidity and enhanced quality of life (physiologically and psychologically). A 
“diagnostic algorithm for adults has been proposed” (Di Rocco, 2014, p. 1905) by Di Rocco 
et al to guide haematologists in “providing timely Gaucher disease diagnosis and treatment” 
(Di Rocco, 2014, p. 1905).  
 
Among children, enzyme replacement therapy can have a particularly positive impact. 
Results have shown that anaemia and thrombocytopenia normalises within 6 to 8 years, 
whilst “liver and spleen sizes decrease dramatically with treatment” (Andersson, 2008, p. 
1182). Bone crises tend to disappear with treatment. “Although improvement in bone 
manifestations is slow, average height normalises after 8 years of treatment compared with 





4.5 Criteria for treatment of Gaucher disease 
The South African Guidelines for management of Gaucher disease (Bhengu, 2011, p. 698) 
state that one of the aims of intervention in Gaucher disease patients is first and foremost to 
avoid irreversible organ (liver, spleen) damage and complications such as bone, pulmonary 
and neurological complications.   
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4.6 Treatment options 
Since “type 1 Gaucher disease is one of the most prevalent lysosomal storage diseases” 
(Weinreb N. , 2015, p. 2), it was also “the first to be treated successfully with 
pharmacological enzyme replacement therapy” (Weinreb N. , 2015, p. 2). As already alluded 
to, early diagnosis and treatment with ERT leads to reduction in liver and organ size, 
recovery of haematological parameters, and most importantly, prevention and resolution of 
bone symptoms (Weinreb N. , 2002, p. 112).  
“There are not a wide variety of treatment options available for Gaucher type 1 disease” 
(Bhengu, 2011). ERT for type 1 Gaucher disease has been available for more than 25 years, 
“since 1991” (Barton, 1991, p. 1264) (Rohrbach, 2007, p. 2697). It was first introduced as a 
“human placenta-derived enzyme (alglucerase, Ceredase®, Genzyme, Sanofi, Cambridge, 
MA, USA)” (Hollak, 2012, p. 529) (Znidar, 2014, p. 2) and since “1994, as imiglucerase 
(Cerezyme®, Genzyme), a human recombinant form of the enzyme” (Hollak, 2012, p. 529) 
(Znidar, 2014, p. 2). “A second recombinant human enzyme replacement therapy, 
velaglucerase-alfa (Vipriv®, Shire Human Genetic Therapies, Dublin, Ireland)” (Hollak, 
2012, p. 529) (Znidar, 2014, p. 2) and “a third, taliglucerase alfa (Elelyso™, Protalix Carmel, 
Israel)” (Znidar, 2014, p. 2) “which is a plant cell-expressed acid β-glucocerebrosidase, was 
approved in the United States and other countries in 2012” (Rosenbaum, 2014, p. 2). 
Eligustat tartrate is a novel oral treatment for Gaucher disease recently launched in Europe. 
“Enzyme replacement therapy: imiglucerase” (Cerezyme), the “analogue of human 
intracellular glucocerebrosidase”, administered intravenously over a 1 to 2 hour period, “is 
the treatment of choice for type 1 Gaucher disease” (Bhengu, 2011, p. 698). This is also “the 
only product currently registered” (Bhengu, 2011, p. 698) and available “in South Africa” 
(Bhengu, 2011, p. 698) for treatment of Gaucher disease.  
Dosages should be individualised to each patient on an individual basis. This “may be 
increased or decreased depending on various clinical manifestations” (Bhengu, 2011, p. 698) 
and achievement of therapeutic goals.  
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According to Mistry et al, patients who received timely treatment with imiglucerase “within 2 
years of diagnosis” (Mistry, 2009, p. 561) demonstrated “a significantly decreased incidence” 
(Mistry, 2009, p. 561) of “avascular necrosis” (Mistry, 2009, p. 561). In addition, not only 
does imiglucerase significantly improve bone mineral density, it also “decreases the risk of 
skeletal events” (Sims, 2008, p. 439) such as “fractures, lytic lesions and infarctions” (Sims, 
2008, p. 439). Imiglucerase also significantly reduces bone pain within 3 months and bone 
crises within 12 months (Sims, 2008, p. 430). 
According to the “South African guidelines for management of Gaucher disease” (Bhengu, 
2011, p. 699), a pregnant patient may be “treated with enzyme replacement therapy” 
(Bhengu, 2011, p. 699) for the full gestational period (Bhengu, 2011, p. 699). If patients 
decline the pharmacological treatment option of enzyme replacement therapy, other 
supportive therapy including analgesia, bisphosphonate therapy and supportive intervention 
with blood products may be considered. Mobility aids like crutches and wheelchairs can also 
be used. 




Mostly, “the clinical course and life expectancy” (Pastores, 2004, p. 4) of type 1 Gaucher 
disease “are extremely variable” (Pastores, 2004, p. 4), “encompassing a spectrum ranging 
from wide-ranging disease presenting early in childhood” (Pastores, 2004, p. 4) to an indolent 
or sometimes “asymptomatic disorder discovered unexpectedly in elderly adults” (Pastores, 
2004, p. 4). Mostly, the disease is progressive, although at dissimilar rates. “Symptomatic 
patients may die prematurely due to consequences of severe crippling skeletal disease, 
bleeding complications, infection or liver failure” (Pastores, 2004, p. 5).  
 
Sometimes disease progression can be quick and relentless, whilst at other times, gradual and 
“erratic, punctuated by periods of rapid exacerbation and clinical crises interspersed with 
sometimes long periods (sometimes lasting for months or even many years) of dormancy” 
(Pastores, 2004, p. 5).  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
19 
 
“Disease severity may even be individually unevenly distributed according to different organ 
compartments” (Pastores, 2004, p. 5), attacking different organs at different times with major 
disparities in disease severity (Pastores, 2004, pp. 4,5). Weinreb et al found that “estimated 
life expectancy at birth for Gaucher disease type 1 patients was approximately 9 years less 
than for a reference population” (Weinreb N. , 2008, p. 896), based on US (developed nation) 
data  (Weinreb N. , 2008, p. 896).   
 
Some authors even suggest an intrinsic association of type 1 Gaucher disease with multiple 
cancers (Lo, 2010, p. 340) (Taddei, 2009, p. 208), cerebrovascular as well as cardiovascular 
events, and hence contributing to a decreased life expectancy in these patients (Zimran, 2011, 
p. 1468). Insulin resistance, splenectomy, altered iron metabolism and immune dysregulation, 
are some of the factors thought to contribute to the development of malignancy (Nagral, 




4.8.1 Physical consequences of Gaucher disease 
 
Due to the progressive “course of type 1 Gaucher disease” (Hughes D. , 2007, p. 676) it “may 
result in pathological characteristics that may become problematic” (Genzyme Gauchercare, 
2016) or even irreversible. “Manifestations may be severely debilitating and disabling or 
even fatal as a result of haemorrhage, sepsis, and other infections, malignant neoplasms and 
progressive liver and pulmonary disease” (Genzyme Gauchercare, 2016).  
According to Charrow et al, long-term consequences may include (Charrow, 1998, p. 1754): 
 
 Hypersplenism (overactive spleen), spleen infarcts (occlusion of the splenic vascular 
supply), spleen scarring, and formation of nodules (abnormal swelling or aggregation 
of cells) 
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 Advanced liver disease with fibrosis (pseudo cirrhosis) (liver damage and scarring), 
“portal hypertension” (Bandyopadhyay, 2011, p. 801) (an increase in the blood 
pressure within a system of veins called the portal venous system), “oesophageal 
varices” (Henderson, 1991, p. 346) (abnormal, enlarged veins in the lower part of the 
oesophagus), and hepatocellular cancer (liver cancer) 
 Advanced bone involvement with progressive deterioration and eventual irreversible 
disability 
 “Pulmonary hypertension” (Bouquila, 2012, p. 58) (elevated blood pressure in lung 
arteries) (Charrow, 1998, p. 1754). 
 
Consequently, Mistry et al caution that “prompt diagnosis, before the occurrence of 
irreversible complications,” (Mistry, 2011, p. 110) is critical in the successful management of 
Gaucher disease (Mistry, 2011, p. 110). According to Di Rocco et al “irreversible 
complications occur in approximately 25%” (Di Rocco, 2014, p. 1905) of Gaucher disease 
“patients who do not receive timely therapy because of late diagnosis” (Di Rocco, 2014, p. 
1905).  
 
However, many patients’ clinical history reveals previous misdiagnoses that include 
leukaemia (cancer of the body’s blood-forming tissues, including bone marrow and the 
lymphatic system), immune thrombocytopenic purpura (a bleeding disorder affecting blood 
platelets), autoimmune disease (when the body’s immune system destroys healthy body 
tissue), hepatic cirrhosis (long-term liver damage), idiopathic avascular necrosis (cellular 
death of bone components resulting from interruption of blood supply due to an unknown 
cause), viral disease, idiopathic splenomegaly (overactive spleen due to an unknown cause) 
and anaemia of chronic disease (lower than normal red blood cells due to a chronic infection, 
immune activation or malignancy). Misdiagnosis leads to complications such as avascular 
necrosis, osteopenia, liver disease, and bleeding complications as well as inappropriate 
procedures such as splenectomy, liver biopsy and empirical corticosteroid therapy (Mistry, 
2011, p. 110). 
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Mistry et al noted that for many patients subsequently diagnosed with Gaucher disease, there 
seems to be a huge time gap between symptoms and diagnosis (Mistry, 2007, p. 679). 
Because of the rareness of type 1 Gaucher disease many physicians also seem to lack 
familiarity with recognition, diagnosis and treatment (Weinreb N. , 2013, pp. 24-43). Gaucher 
patients are therefore more susceptible “to lack of access to timely and appropriate medical 
care” (Mistry, 2007, p. 697). In order to establish timing of diagnostic delays, Mistry et al 
conducted surveys in 136 type 1 Gaucher disease patients. In this patient group, results 
indicated that the “average time from first manifestation of symptoms to final diagnosis was 
48,7  ± 123,6 months” (Mistry, 2007, p. 697). Mistry et al reported that “14 patients with type 
1 Gaucher disease” (Mistry, 2007, p. 697) endured “symptoms for up to 10 years before 
correct diagnosis” (Mistry, 2007, p. 697) was made in order to elucidate actual consequences 
of diagnostic delays, a finding substantiated by Di Rocco et al (Mistry, 2007, p. 699). Di 
Rocco et al found that Gaucher disease often continues to be unrecognised for many years 
transpiring in significant delays in advantages of treatment with subsequent development of 
irreversible complications. This transpires even though the greater part of “signs and 
symptoms of Gaucher disease” (Di Rocco, 2014, p. 1905) mostly appear in early childhood 
of most patients (Di Rocco, 2014, p. 1905). 
Gaucher disease is often characterised by a lack of strength (asthenia), delayed growth 
“(growth retardation) or delayed puberty” (Bhengu, 2011, p. 699).  Most patients may also 
develop an enlarged spleen (splenomegaly) “that may be complicated” (Charrow, 2000, p. 
2835) by interruption of the splenic blood supply (sometimes superinfected). “In the ICGG 
Registry 87% of Gaucher patients had splenomegaly in excess of 5 times normal” (Charrow, 
2000, p. 2835). An enlarged liver (hepatomegaly) is “frequently” (Lachmann, 2000, p. 239) 
encountered in Gaucher patients. Belmatoug reported a prevalence of “80%”. (Belmatoug, 
2012) This may progress towards fibrosis (scarring) followed by cirrhosis (long-term 
damage) in rare cases (Bhengu, 2011, p. 699). 
Blood disorders like “pancytopenia” (Belmatoug, 2012) (reduction in red blood cells, white 
blood cells and blood platelets) occurs frequently and is associated with various degrees 
(sometimes severe) of thrombocytopenia (low blood platelet count) and anaemia (Belmatoug, 
2012).  
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Gaucher disease also increases “risk of developing Parkinson’s disease later on in life” 
(Henneman, 2016) (Becker, 2013, p. 129) (Platt, 2014, p. 68). According to Rosenbloom et 
al, “the probability that a patient with type 1 Gaucher disease will develop Parkinsonism 
before age 70 years is 5 to 7% and 9 to 12% before age 80 years” (Rosenbloom, 2011, p. 95). 
Although the pathophysiology that results in type 1 Gaucher disease “patients developing 
Parkinsonism is still not well understood” (Rosenbloom, 2011, p. 101), and many patients 
“are not likely to manifest Parkinsonism during their expected lifetime, the incidence of 
Parkinsonism among GD1 patients is nonetheless significantly increased” (Rosenbloom, 
2011, p. 101).  
 
4.8.2 Bone implications 
 
“Skeletal disease is complex and multifaceted, manifesting as chronic bone pain, severe, 
acute avascular osteonecrosis, medullary infarction, osteopenia, osteoporosis, osteolytic 
lesions, pathologic fractures, and growth failure in children” (Mistry, 2015, p. S8). 
 
“Overall skeletal involvement makes the largest contribution to morbidity, disability” 
(Mistry, 2015, p. S6) and quality of life in type 1 Gaucher disease patients (Mistry, 2015, p. 
S6). Mistry et al reported that osteopenia can develop as early as 5 years of age (Mistry, 
2011, p. 139). Children with Gaucher disease may also suffer from growth deficits and 
pubertal delays as well as considerable bone pain and bone crises. In many instances bone 
pain is diagnosed too late and, as previously alluded to, could lead to life-threatening 
fractures, or even avascular necrosis of the hips. Avascular necrosis “can lead to joint 
destruction, the need for joint replacement surgery, and chronic disability, increasing the 
already huge social and financial burden” (Mistry, 2009, p. 561).  
 
The majority (80%) of patients with Gaucher disease present with bone anomalies. Some of 
the signs are “deformations, osteopenia that sometimes causes pathological fractures or 
vertebral compression, bone infarctions or even aseptic osteonecrosis” (Belmatoug, 2012).  
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“Patients may experience severe bone pain, called “bone crisis,” because Gaucher cells in the 
bone marrow may prevent blood from circulating properly” (Belmatoug, 2012). Pain can be 
excruciating, and is frequently accompanied by fever that may last up to a few weeks. 
Patients are often debilitated and remain bedridden during this time. As Gaucher cells 
accumulate in bone marrow, they can restrict normal blood flow—sometimes to the point that 
bone tissue dies. This bone destruction causes severe pain and can lead to fractures and joint 
collapse. “Type 1 Gaucher disease can also cause reduced mass and density of bone tissue, 
resulting in thin and weakened bone that is more susceptible to fractures. Gaucher disease 
causes abnormalities in the way bones develop, causing them to form irregular shapes” 
(Belmatoug, 2012). “The Erlenmeyer flask deformity (so named because its shape resembles 
a type of laboratory flask), in which the ends of the bone (most commonly the femur and tibia 
leg bones) are flared and flattened rather than rounded” (Belmatoug, 2012) is very commonly 
encountered. Morbidity due to bone manifestations can cause extremely reduced quality of 
life due to the risk of “bone crises” and bone fractures. Quality of life is also influenced by 
the cost of hospitalisation, days lost to unproductivity and loss of earning potential, as well as 
the risk of severe hospital-acquired infections, which could obviously decrease a patient’s life 
expectancy (Belmatoug, 2012).  
 
Physical health is clearly beneficial to its possessor, and preferable to illness. Simultaneously, 
the proper functioning of physical organs is imperative to the needs of any human being, and 
obviously intrinsically pleasurable (Norman, 1998, p. 15). The question begs thus, what 
general formula can we find that will satisfy all three of these conditions? Living your life 
efficiently might well thus define a life of excellence in accordance to being a complete life. 
Thus, a patient with Gaucher disease who is timely diagnosed and receives adequate enzyme 
replacement therapy might be a good candidate for increased quality of life and also a more 
complete and fulfilled life, reaching their full potential as an individual, and making a 
meaningful contribution to society (Masek, 1999). 
 
 
4.8.3 Psychological, social and quality-of-life consequences  
Symptomatic “Gaucher disease may diminish patients’ emotional feelings of well-being” 
(Genzyme Gauchercare, 2016) (Damiano, 1998, p. 373) and functional health 
(GaucherAssociationUK, 2016) (Genzyme Gauchercare, 2016) (Meikle, 1999, p. 281). 
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According to Gaucher disease patients, the most debilitating physical symptoms interfering 
with schoolwork, social and work life are chronic fatigue and bone pain (Hayes, 1998, p. 
531) (Charrow, 2004, p. 112).  
 
Giraldo et al reported interesting observations regarding self-perception in patients with 
Gaucher disease (Giraldo, 2005, p. 453). The authors recorded their observations after 
applying the SF-36 health survey questionnaire twice; prior to starting “enzyme replacement 
therapy and after 2 years of enzyme replacement therapy in 69 type 1 Gaucher disease 
patients” (Giraldo, 2005, p. 453). At baseline the patients showed severe restriction in 
physical functioning scores. Additionally, “improvement in self-perception of global health 
was observed, from 34.3% before enzyme replacement therapy to 91.4% after enzyme 
replacement therapy (p<0.001)” (Giraldo, 2005, p. 453). The authors concluded that benefits 
derived from enzyme replacement therapy “are cumulative and accrue over the course of the 
follow-up of disease assessed over 2 years” (Giraldo, 2005, p. 461).  
Similar reports from other studies suggest “that early intervention, prior to advanced Gaucher 
disease offers the best possibility of good outcome” (Giraldo, 2005, p. 461) (Masek, 1999, p. 
263). 
“Emotional issues relating to Gaucher disease can put strain on individual patients and their 
entire families” (Genzyme Gauchercare, 2016) (Hayes, 1998, pp. 526,527). Hayes et al 
reported on “patients' health-related quality of life (HRQoL) of patients with Gaucher 
disease” (Hayes, 1998, p. 521). The authors “interviewed 16 patients with type I Gaucher 
disease (range 8-67 years)” (Hayes, 1998, p. 522). Thirteen out of 16 patients “had been 
receiving enzyme replacement therapy for at least 6 months” (Hayes, 1998, p. 521). The 
following factors related to quality of life were studied:  “physical health, social life, 
emotional health, financial burden, future plans and satisfaction with health care” (Hayes, 
1998, p. 521). Hayes et al reported that when the 16 Gaucher disease patients who received 
enzyme replacement therapy but without splenectomy were asked how Gaucher disease 
affected their physical activity, eight (50%) indicated that the disease had a definite effect on 
their job/schoolwork or household/family obligations. Two (29%) of the patients who 
received enzyme replacement therapy and had a splenectomy, reported an effect on their 
schoolwork or jobs, whilst 4 (67%) reported an impact on their job and family obligations 
(Hayes, 1998, pp. 526,527).  
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These results indicated that Gaucher patients included in this study were most incapacitated 
by “bone pain and chronic fatigue” (Hayes, 1998, p. 521) which “interfered with school, job 
and social activities” (Hayes, 1998, p. 521).  Thus, Gaucher disease can ultimately also 
impact quite severely on quality-of-life (Hayes, 1998, p. 521). Patients reported “a significant 
increase in energy level” (Hayes, 1998, p. 521) from enzyme replacement therapy as well as 
“significant improvements in quality of life” (Hayes, 1998, p. 521). Although therapy had a 
significantly “positive influence on the patients’ health-related quality of life” (Hayes, 1998, 
p. 521), anxiety related to the means of financing treatment, added additional emotional 
distress to these patients (Hayes, 1998, p. 532). 
A common occurrence in children with type 1 Gaucher disease, is growth restriction and 
“delayed onset of puberty” (Charrow, 2004, p. 112). Half “(50%) of the symptomatic 
children are at or below the third percentile of height” (Charrow, 2004, p. 112) and 1 in 4 
“(25%) are shorter than expected” (Charrow, 2004, p. 112).  
Patients may be confronted with feelings of inferiority because smaller stature and “body 
image can be a difficult challenge” (Grabowski, 2004, p. 61) for individuals “who have an 
enlarged spleen and/or liver” (Grabowski, 2004, p. 61). Children during formative years, 
especially “children who may already suffer from a negative self-image” (Genzyme 
Gauchercare, 2016) or low self-esteem may find this exceptionally difficult.  
Emotional issues associated with Gaucher disease can become increasingly disconcerting for 
children who are at an age where it is imperative for the child to “fit in” with their peers. 
(GaucherAssociationUK, 2016). Paediatric patients may also “experience feelings of anger, 
denial, fear, insecurity and isolation” (Grabowski, 2004, p. 61). Thus, delay in growth and 
puberty at the adolescent age in comparison with their peers, can be a source of significant 
anxiety and stress to patients and their families (Kauli, 2000, p. 162). As previously 
mentioned, it is important to note that, amongst others, Andersson et al reported that growth 
in children responds well to enzyme replacement therapy (Andersson, 2008, p. 1182). 
Counselling and encouragement for healthy socialisation skills might be necessary in these 
children.    
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Chronic pain and “fatigue may affect school performance and participation in physical 
activities” (Charrow, 2004, p. 112). Results from a study by Hayes et al indicated that 88% of 
patients included in a HRQoL study reported being easily fatigued (Hayes, 1998, p. 525). As 
a consequence of the fatigue associated with anaemia, “some children may even lack the 
energy and stamina to play with other children” (Genzyme Gauchercare, 2016) and even find 
it difficult to fulfil ordinary tasks like concentrating on homework (Genzyme Gauchercare, 
2016). Depending on the severity of the disease, children and adults with Gaucher disease 
might have ever increasing physical and emotional needs.  
 
Masek et al investigated the long-term (2-year) “effect of enzyme replacement therapy on 
health-related quality of life in 25 adults with type 1 Gaucher disease” (Masek, 1999, p. 263). 
Quality of life assessment was conducted with the “SF-36 Health Survey (SF-36)” (Masek, 
1999, p. 263) whilst “psychological functioning was assessed using the Symptom Checklist 
90R” (Masek, 1999, p. 263).  
Results indicated a statistically “significant improvement in most (7 of 8) SF scale scores 
starting at 18 months of therapy” (Masek, 1999, p. 263). Vitality (energy level and fatigue) 
accounted for the first SF scale showing statistically significant improvement at 6 months of 
therapy. Role-Physical and Social Functioning indicated the SF-36 scales with the largest 
improvements. Masek et al also reported a “significant improvement in mood and global 
functioning and fewer psychological symptoms” (Masek, 1999, p. 263) after 2 years of 
therapy. Ultimately, the authors conclude that “enzyme replacement therapy for type 1 
Gaucher disease has a positive impact on health-related quality of life from the patient's 
perspective” (Masek, 1999, p. 265).  
 
Damiano et al interviewed 212 patients, 14 years and older treated with “enzyme replacement 
therapy from 1 to 51 months” (Damiano, 1998, p. 373). The authors utilised the SF-36 health 
survey and three questions about physical, mental and general “health related quality of life 
(HRQoL)” (Damiano, 1998, p. 373) since starting enzyme replacement therapy were asked. 
When asked about “changes in health related quality of life (HRQoL)” (Damiano, 1998, p. 
373) since starting enzyme replacement therapy, at least half of the patients reported fewer 
limitations in physical activities (53%), better general health perceptions (77%) and less 
negative emotions (49%) at the time of the interview (Damiano, 1998, p. 373). 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
27 
 
A study by Packman et al revealed a number of “psychosocial needs and concerns” 
(Packman, 2010, p. 2002) commonly experienced by Gaucher disease patients (Packman, 
2010, p. 2002). These include: difficulty to cope with diagnosis, detrimental effects of fatigue 
and pain on the jobs, careers and recreational activities of patients, financial concerns due to 
lack of insurance concerns as well as psychological distress (Packman, 2010, p. 2008). 
McAllister et al proposes “ecology of social impact variables, including associated burdens, 
sequelae and emotional manifestations in rare genetic conditions” (McAllister, 2007) 
(Wienke, 2014, p. 80). According to Packman, the genetic condition and subsequent burden 
of disease include, amongst others, the lack of access to and sharing of information, lack of 
public knowledge and genetic fatalism and/or determinism. These may lead to important 
primary sequelae. Diagnostic delay, explanation fatigue, fears for future generations, impact 
on job status and health and payment systems, are only some of the many primary sequelae 
associated with rare diseases. These may further manifest in vindication, provider mistrust, 
fear for self and children, as well as guilt and misconceptions and uncertainty.  
 
Although the full social impact of dealing with Gaucher disease has not been clearly 
described as yet, Wienke et al “developed a model to explain the social impacts of another 
rare genetic disorder, alpha-1 antitrypsin deficiency (AATD)” (Wienke, 2014, p. 75). 
According to the author, this model may assist in “future development of psychometric 
instrumentation to measure the social burden of similar rare diseases with a genetic etiology” 
(Wienke, 2014, p. 75). Two pilot studies were conducted and “interviews with 42 patients 
and caregivers living with AATD were collected” (Wienke, 2014, p. 75). The results of the 
study by Wienke et al, suggests refinements and expansion to the conceptual framework 
proposed by McAllister et al (Wienke, 2014, p. 80). An example of Wienke’s thematic 
synthesis is that the impact domain such as genetic etiology can potentially lead to genetic 
determinism (where genes, along with environmental conditions determine morphology and 
behavior) and/or genetic fatalism (genetic basis of a trait perceived to be unchangeable). This 
may in turn impact all relationships. The participant experiences a lack of control and 
perceives the gene to determine their future. Possible psychological sequelae of this include 
fear not only for future health but also fear for many generations to come and hence adaptive 
behavioral modifications towards extreme vigilance.  
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Similarly, not only does sharing of genetic information consign the responsibility to inform 
family members about risks, it can also adversely affect patient/family relationships and lead 
to “testing decisions, guilt, and fear for future generations and strain within the family 
dynamic” (Wienke, 2014, p. 78).  
 
Future research specifically focusing on Gaucher disease, might also shed additional light on 
the social impact of this rare and chronic genetic condition on patients. 
 
As with any other rare disease, genetic counselling of the family (parents, siblings and 
affected individuals) is of the utmost importance. It supplies supportive care for the family 
and is best provided by a physician that has experience with Gaucher type 1 disease. 
Counselling also enables the family to understand the role of inheritance, strategies to prevent 
recurrence and best possible scenarios, providing couples with knowledge and control in 
order to make informed decisions (Bhengu, 2011, p. 698) (Zuckerman, 2007, p. 1281).  
 
It is a well-known fact that the shortage of trained genetic professionals (geneticists and 
genetic counsellors) leaves much of the population without access to appropriate services 
(Beighton, 2012, p. 447). In addition, because rare diseases occur with smaller prevalence, 
national health programs do not seem to prioritize funding for these diseases. Without clear, 
transparent treatment guidelines and predictable reimbursement policies, some patients with 
rare diseases may unfortunately face an uncertain future.  
 
  





Type 1 Gaucher disease and associated ethical issues 
 
1. Resource Allocation 
1.1 Introduction 
 
One of the most unequivocal and compelling implications of equal opportunity, lies in the 
realm of fair and just healthcare. The fundamental principle is that a fair and just healthcare 
system should strive to eliminate obstacles to opportunity as a result of disease, i.e. utilising 
an intervention to timely recognise, diagnose, cure or prevent the disease (Buchanan, 2000, p. 
16).  
 
It is virtually and certainly materially unviable to provide the best possible healthcare for 
every single patient, especially in resource constrained settings (Mosadeghrad, 2014, pp. 83, 
84). If this endeavour takes place whilst both trying to provide individuals with a freedom of 
choice and guaranteeing equal care, the dream of containing costs of health care is a most 
definite impossibility. Engelhardt is of the notion that the difficulties in achieving a nirvana 
of equality can mainly be attributed to the competing views regarding beneficence, 
inequalities and justice. It requires a careful balancing act between those who have and those 
who need. Engelhardt compares this to "a coercive act of totalitarian ideological zeal" which 
does not take into account any diversity or multiplicity of moral vision (Engelhardt, 2014, p. 
645). Engelhardt deems that the road in pursuit of equality has numerous practical and moral 
obstacles and no one should be held accountable or feel morally and socially obliged to aid 
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Treatment of rare diseases like Gaucher disease are invariably highly priced; healthcare 
policymakers are continuously presented with unrelenting challenges regarding resource 
allocation for these orphan drugs (McCabe, 2005, p. 1016) (Hughes D. , 2005, p. 315).  
 
We should be mindful of the fact that limiting the access of orphan medicines to patients who 
suffer from a rare disease will result in this group of patients, being left untreated. 
Conversely, in choosing to reimburse an expensive orphan drug, this may result in a 
considerable number of patients with a more prevalent disease being deprived of more cost-
effective treatments. This contradiction in terms raises important questions on social justice 
and fairness (Hughes D. , 2005, p. 315). Equality surely necessitates “that we do not 
discriminate between individuals on morally irrelevant grounds” (McKie, 2003, p. 2407). 
Cost should therefore not be considered the only determining factor for access to medicine. 
 
The complexity of decision-making seen in resource allocation, when we treat patients with a 
rare disease such as Gaucher disease as an excellent example, reflects many of the 
multifaceted issues of dealing with expensive and limited health-associated resources (Brock, 
2006) (Panju, 2010, p. 182) (Gross, 2002, p. 151) (Bastias, 2011). Because of their wide-
ranging physiological as well as psychological ramifications, rare diseases “require an 
ongoing multi-disciplinary team approach to treatment” (Wang, 2011, p. 458) which 
increases costs considerably (Wang, 2011, p. 458). Some health systems even “demand that 
each new therapy be demonstrated to be cost-effective” (Wang, 2011, p. 459) which may 
prove an arduous task for rare diseases (Wang, 2011, p. 459).  
   
Starting with the burden and cost of treating a rare disease like Gaucher disease, the 
following discussion of ethical principles pertinent to resource allocation in healthcare will 
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1.2 The burden and cost of treating Gaucher disease  
 
High cost treatments are usually challenged because they seem less cost-effective versus 
treatments perceived to be costing somewhat less. When looking at placing a value on health, 
there are two schools of thought. Daniels et al hold that health deserves priority funding in 
relation to other public goods (Daniels, 2008).  
However, other authors are of the opinion that health as well as other public goods that 
impact on health, are closely connected and therefore priority should not only be given to 
healthcare alone (Segall, 2010) (Wilson, 2009).  
Mavroudis et al hold that “most models are designed to inform policy decisions by 
quantifying aspects of resource allocation” (Mavroudis, 2015, p. 1623) which are seemingly 
immeasurable, like “benefits to society of treating certain” (Mavroudis, 2015, p. 1623) 
disorders, “the value of an individual life” (Mavroudis, 2015, p. 1623), as well as “the 
difference in a human life’s worth” (Mavroudis, 2015, p. 1623) when taking into 
consideration significant morbidity. It is, however, infinitely easier to quantify treatment 
costs rather than more abstract concepts such as quality of life (Mavroudis, 2015, p. 1623). It 
is evident that healthcare resource allocation in a society with limited resources like South 
Africa, while “ethically troubling” (Mavroudis, 2015, p. 1624), necessitates an explicit 
estimation or quantification of “human life” (Mavroudis, 2015, p. 1624).  
In South Africa, a utilitarian approach is followed by the National Health Department 
(Hattingh, 2015, p. 17). The utilitarian approach “is important in evaluating different 
treatment modalities for” (Mavroudis, 2015, p. 1624) more commonly encountered diseases 
like HIV or tuberculosis; however its use might be much more challenging and even sub-
optimal when dealing with rare and costly disorders like Gaucher disease (Mavroudis, 2015, 
p. 1624). Justifiably, since HIV and tuberculosis are contagious diseases with the potential to 
infect a large number of people, versus rare diseases from a genetic origin, the total impact on 
public health could be considerably larger. This has to be taken into consideration when 
reflecting on the differences in resource allocation for different diseases. 
 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
32 
 
Given the small number of patients diagnosed with Gaucher disease, the total cost impact 
may be limited. There has been substantial evidence proving that, due to low cost, that it 
might in actual fact warrant funding (Hughes D. , 2005, p. 832).  
 
Individuals with serious genetic defects may place an additional burden on society. 
Difficulties face many people with Gaucher disease regarding access to proper treatment, 
sufficient dosing, and, maintenance of insurance coverage (Wang, 2011, p. 459). The costly 
treatment raises legitimate questions involving public and private economic considerations 
for policy makers and healthcare providers, especially regarding access to proper medical 
care, social justice and suitable allocation of resources (Mayberry, 2006, p. 103). 
 
In this case study, the decision rests heavily on the fact that the newly diagnosed mother 
(Mrs. X) needs to be on lifelong treatment herself. Using enzyme replacement therapy is 
expensive, which restricts access to these procedures. Parents with high socioeconomic status 
or adequate reimbursement from a medical aid may have easier access to this technology. 
The goal of social justice is to treat each individual with the dignity and respect he/she 
inherently deserves as a human being and therefore, to try to accommodate these individuals 
in terms of treatment (WHO, 2002) (Robinson, 2016). However, rare orphan diseases are by 
definition low prevalence which renders the overall outlay not too excessive when compared 
with other treatment modalities. According to Esfandiary et al, creating a genetic medicine 
for serious human diseases does not sacrifice human dignity but rather respects it by 
“allowing individuals to achieve their potential with an equal opportunity” (Esfandiary, 1998, 
p. 512).  
 
There are currently 85 patients diagnosed with Gaucher disease in South Africa of which 69 
are receiving enzyme replacement treatment (Genzyme, 2016). Note that treatment includes 
commercial and free treatment (humanitarian assistance, patients who were part of global 
clinical trials and receive free supply of drug).  Ten patients are currently receiving free ERT 
treatment. The yearly cost of enzyme replacement treatment for the 10 public sector patients 
with Gaucher disease, who are diagnosed but not treated, is approximately R 7,8 million 
(Genzyme, 2016). This is not a huge amount if one compares the yearly costs associated with 
Gaucher disease to that of treatment of, for instance, HIV and TB.  
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An argument can be made supporting a much stronger role for the public sector in priority 
setting and allocation of more funding for rare diseases.  
 
With a greater shift to prioritising HIV and TB, budget cuts for amongst others, genetic 
testing services (which is an essential tool in the diagnosis of congenital disorders) resulting 
in inadequate staff and equipment have resulted in these services being severely 
compromised in recent years (Malherbe, 2015, p. 186). 
 
According to UNAIDS (2015), there are currently about 7 million people living with HIV in 
South Africa (Morah, 2016). Morah further reports that the prevalence rate is 19.2% in adults 
15 to 49 years of age. If one considers the high infection rate and the size of its population 
(more than 54.96 million (www.statssa.gov.za), this proportion is quite significant. 
HIV/AIDS also has a considerable influence on the economy as well as business and thus 
receives remarkable attention from both “South African government as well as from the 
business community” (Ostheimer, 2004).  
 
According to Smart, et al, (2015) the “National Strategic Plan for HIV/AIDS, STIs and TB 
has a set target that 80% of people living with HIV must be on antiretrovirals (ARVs) by 
2016” (Smart, 2015), which is about “4,8 million people” (Smart, 2015).  The South African 
Minister of Health reported that >3 million people are currently receiving treatment for HIV 
(UNAID Gaps Report 2016). Because so many people are dependent on this medicine, an 
important consideration is thus cost. Smart et al further reports that currently, “the overall 
tender covering the three-year period from 1 April 2015 to 31 March 2018 is over R 14,2 
billion” (Smart, 2015). This comprises largely of a first-line fixed-dose combination (FDC) of 
efavirenz/ tenofovir/ emtricitabine. By perusing the Department of Health’s (DOH) 
purchasing catalogue – which basically gives all the products and their volumes and values 
on tender - and if one looks at the contribution of HIV treatment to overall value and volume 
in the tender, just the combination HIV products make up 35% of the total predicted value of 
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Similarly, according to Pooran et al (2013), if the National drug resistant tuberculosis 
guidelines in South Africa are followed, the cost per patient of extensively-drug resistant 
tuberculosis is approximately R 352 070.00, four times greater than multi drug resistant 
tuberculosis (R 90 339.00) and 103 times greater than drug-sensitive tuberculosis 
(R 3 429.00) (Pooran, 2013). Pooran et al further state that “despite drug-resistant 
tuberculosis comprising only 2.2% of the case burden, it consumed a huge ~32% of the total 
estimated national tuberculosis budget of R 2.9 billion” (Pooran, 2013). Anti-tuberculosis 
medicine and hospitalization contribute to “45% and 25% of the DR-TB costs, respectively” 
(Pooran, 2013, p. 1). Newer data estimates extensively-drug resistant tuberculosis at >1 500 
cases per year which is more than double the 741 cases that Pooran et al (2013) included in 
their calculations (Pooran, 2013). 
 
All resources are scarce and understandably careful consideration should take place to weigh 
health benefits versus societies’ aspirations. Governments should therefore recognise the 
inequalities and “vulnerabilities in health status” associated with rare diseases (ICORD, 
2012) and should thus endeavour to develop specific policies to address them. All aspects 
related to rare diseases should be addressed, “including research, clinical care, information 
resources and development of treatment” (ICORD, 2012). In addition, should health 
economics be used (if applicable) in affected individuals like the case study of Mrs. X, the 
holistic spectrum of personal, social as well as economic benefits of treating a rare disease 
like type 1 Gaucher disease should be strongly considered. 
 
Both the “United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Article 25.1)” (Forman, 
2012, p. 806) and the “International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(Article 12.1)” (Forman, 2012, p. 806) underscore “the right of everyone to the highest 
attainable standard of physical and mental health” (ICORD, 2012). South Africa functions 
within a rights-based constitution (e.g. progressive realisation) and changes are anticipated 
towards universal health coverage whilst still being cognizant of the economic environment 
as well as societal priorities.  Within the South African context, a national healthcare package 
like the proposed NHI needs to contain essential elements pertinent to the welfare of 
children’s health and thus include rare diseases. Great strides are also currently being made 
on compiling an Essential Package of “Health Care for Children in South Africa” (Henley, 
2000, p. 601) (EPaCC) (Westwood, 2016). 
 




Bayefsky is of the notion that one of the universal rights of mankind is “health care and 
treatment” of a “rare” disease (Bayefsky, 1990). In this regard, ICORD stipulates that the 
following aspects necessitate careful consideration: “non-discrimination”, fairness and equity 
of access to healthcare (ICORD, 2012). Thus, not focusing only on diseases with high 
prevalence in South Africa e.g. HIV and tuberculosis, but urgent attention is similarly 
required to develop novel policies for a lower prevalence rare disease like Gaucher disease, 
that requires high cost treatment. 
 
On each society rests the onerous decision of allocating resources to different healthcare 
needs. Even where most people have access to some kind of healthcare, within countries, 
inequalities in health status continue to persist alongside social and economic inequalities. 
Decisions of where to allocate health care funds usually rests on cost-benefit and cost-
effectiveness analyses (Nussbaum, 1993) (Kuhse, 2009, p. 351). However, these are also 
open to interpretation since judgement concerns numerous ethical challenges, begging 
independent consideration of many moral principles rather than a blanket approach of one-
size-fits-all.  
 
The most often used metrics of medical benefit used is “quality-adjusted-life-year (QALY) 
and disability-adjusted-life-year (DALY)” (Kuhse, 2009, p. 353) which unfortunately do not 
always take life “compromised by symptoms and functional limitations” into consideration 
(Kuhse, 2009, p. 353). An advantage of QALY and other measures of health-related quality 
of life is equality regarding benefit where one unit counts the same regardless of who gets the 
benefit (Kuhse, 2009, p. 355). However, maximization of the sum total of benefits does not 
necessarily treat people on equal terms, sometimes giving an unfair advantage to patients 
whose treatment costs are less versus medicines whose costs are more expensive. Treatment 
access of orphan drugs may produce numerous arduous “conflicts between the claims of 
individuals to the right of access to treatment versus society at large” (Picavet, 2013). “The 
principles of equity and non-abandonment imply that” (Picavet, 2013) patients suffering from 
life-threatening diseases should have access to these medicines, whilst conversely “society 
may wish to allocate the health budget to interventions with a view to maximizing the health 
of the population as a whole” (Picavet, 2013). Maximization thus favours larger patient 
groups treated with cheaper medicines and disfavours small patient groups with rare diseases 
treated with more expensive treatment modalities.   
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In this context, Pinxten et al recommend an ethical healthcare framework encompassing a 
sustainable model with a fair or equitable share for all. The aptly called “Anne of Green 
Gables” principle based on the philosophy of, amongst others, broad inclusiveness describes 
possible randomized access for all, including patients with rare diseases including patients 
suffering from Gaucher disease. Alternatively, Pinxten proposes access for some patients, 
allocated according to rational priorities as well as budgetary insulation of a guaranteed, 
though limited share of resources specifically dedicated to rare diseases (Pinxten, 2012). With 
regards to Gaucher disease, this will allow a fair share of resources to these patients, by 
bestowing a specific part of the yearly National Health Budget in South Africa to treatment of 
Gaucher disease patients, with possible annual increases. 
 
If one looks at the utilitarian approach to distributive justice, this equates to ‘bringing the 
greatest good to the greatest number’ and generally underscores economic evaluations. 
“When resources are construed as social goods” (Rachels, 2003) as per the utilitarian 
principle, resource allocation may proceed on a cumulative “basis by evaluating which 
distribution might produce the greatest amount of good for the greatest number of people” 
(Rachels, 2003). When resources are limited as is mostly the case in a developing country 
like South Africa, resource allocation might however become a problem. A utilitarian theory 
of justice depicts that whatever produces the greatest overall good, will be just. However, in 
the resource allocation scenario, utilitarianism advocates maximization of “utility or 
happiness of the many, even if it is at the expense of the few or the individual” (Mavroudis, 
2015). Consequently, utilitarian principles represent society as a whole and seemingly 
disregard “the needs of the minority or of groups that may require more resources to achieve 
the same level of utility as the mass population” (Mavroudis, 2015, p. 1623).  
 
As previously alluded to, “cost-effectiveness is, however, not purely an economic concern, 
because to improve people’s health and well-being is also a moral concern” (Brock, 2006, p. 
259) which should thus guide us towards “the importance of equitable attention and access to 
treatment for a rare disease” (ICORD, 2012) like Gaucher disease. The ethical dilemma is 
how to create equilibrium between all the different ethical principles. Often overlooked is the 
fact that managing any health care resource, at either the individual or population level, 
involves copious conflicting ethical considerations and moral obligations, especially with 
regards to distributive justice (Gandjour, 2015, p. e44) (Daniels, 2014, p. 599).   
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1.3 Resource allocation and justice 
 
In this section, the following theories of justice pertinent to resource allocation in rare 
diseases are discussed. The principle of distributive justice becomes crucial where resource 
allocation with regards to equal distribution of scarce resources, becomes challenging. The 
liberation theory of justice is important due to freedom of choice of goods. Furthermore, 
resource allocation should ideally be fair, according to the egalitarian theory of justice and 
should benefit everyone equally. 
 
Aristotle was the first philosopher who introduced “the principle of distributive justice, the 
proper distribution of benefits and burdens” (Beauchamp, 2013). According to Aristole 
“equals must be treated equally and unequals must be treated unequally” (Beauchamp, 2001, 
p. 227).  
 
John Rawls is, however, deemed as one of the most significant and influential political and 
moral philosophers of the twentieth-century. He is primarily known for his book A Theory of 
Justice, in which he attempts to define social justice through a social contractual approach 
(Rawls, 2009). Rawls believed that each person has his/her own potential and abilities to 
fulfil. Rawls proposed “justice as fairness” which equates to a basic agreement of what is 
fair with regards to social cooperation between equal persons. He believed that justice 
commonly requires that unless a disparate distribution is to everyone’s advantage, basic 
social goods, for example opportunity and liberty, “income and wealth, and the” basis “of 
self-respect”, be dispersed evenly between persons (Freeman, 2003, p. 1). Rawls’ work was 
mostly based on the fundamental principles of what the most appropriate and feasible moral 
conception of justice and fairness would be for a democratic and free society, thereby 
ensuring equality for all citizens (Freeman, 2003, p. 2). Rawls believes “that the basic 
structure of society is the principal subject of justice” (Freeman, 2003, p. 4).  
 
Rawls recognizes two main principles: the first that each person should have equal rights 
consistent with other people enjoying similar liberties; and secondly, that inequalities should 
be so arrayed that no person is unfairly disadvantaged. He thus developed an egalitarian 
notion of justice that would allow fairness and equal opportunity to people born with fewer 
advantages and into less favourable social positions (Rawls, 2009).   
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Rawls’ principle of distributive justice does not necessarily mean that fairness of distribution 
is only dependent on merely imposing present status quo thereby giving each person his or 
her due (Freeman, 2003, p. 6). He believes that “people should be held responsible for their 
ends” (Freeman, 2003, p. 8) and envisaged that they “adjust their desires to the fair share of 
resources they can legitimately expect” (Freeman, 2003, p. 8). Rawls deemed his theory of 
justice as an alternative and even superseding that of utilitarianism. Thus, John Rawls deems 
that every person should be provided an equal opportunity (Buchanan, 2000, p. 16). Rawls 
believes that any factors which might limit a person’s opportunity should be eliminated or 
ameliorated in order to equalize the playing field. Rawls is of the opinion that justice is not 
essentially related to restoring disparities inflicted by misfortune or birth, but that justice is 
predominantly about providing each person with “adequate means in order to fulfil their 
’moral powers’ of free, responsible, and rational agency” (Denier, 2007, p. 153).  
The notion of distributive justice becomes increasingly critical in situations where there is 
augmented contest for scarce resources. Equitable and reasonable dispersal of resources is 
predominantly essential in developing countries like South Africa. According to Beauchamp 
et al, distributive justice deals with the “fair, equitable and appropriate distribution by 
justified norms that structure the terms of social cooperation” (Beauchamp, 2013). According 
to this principle, it would thus obviously be unjust to withhold treatment in a patient just 
“because their disease is rare” (Picavet, 2012, p. 116) or treatment expensive. Thus, if 
applying the distributive justice principle in the rare diseases arena, Reidenberg et al held that 
the definition of “an essential medicine” should “be changed to include medicines needed for 
people with rare diseases” (Reidenberg, 2006, p. 686). Thus, “distributive justice” 
(Reidenberg, 2006, p. 686) can be used as a moral basis for such a change and cost-
effectiveness analysis can be the method used to select which medicines to include in the 
“Model List” (Reidenberg, 2006, p. 686). 
According to Brock et al, resource allocation in health is usually based on two pivotal ethical 
criteria, namely cost-effectiveness and justice (equitability), keeping in mind that resources 
should also be allotted to maximize health benefits (to improve health) for the population 
served. Thus, morally, improving people’s health and well-being should also be taken into 
consideration, deviating from the general idea that cost-effectiveness should solely revolve 
around economic concerns.   
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In lieu of the ignorance towards improving benefits specifically relating to health and well-
being, the philosophical notion of utilitarianism or consequentialism, are widely criticized, by 
amongst others, John Rawls (Brock, 2006, p. 259). According to Rawls, “the difference 
principle” (Freeman, 2003, p. 8) dictates what a person may justly and legitimately insist on. 
This means that everyone should receive enough means in order to fulfil “everyone’s 
capacities for free and responsible agency” (Freeman, 2003, p. 8).  
 
 
Justice focuses on fairness and equity in the distribution of health resources: a pertinent 
example for instance, is that those who have little socioeconomic power should receive 
similar care to those who have more socioeconomic power. “Justice is the assurance that all 
people receive fair and equal treatment” (Lea, 2005, p. 237) (Beauchamp, 2001, p. 165).  
In fact, according to Putoto et al, in recent years the “notion that public opinion can influence 
the decision making process has gained momentum” (Putoto, 2011).  
 
Being cognizant of public opinion in healthcare matters, which might sometimes differ from 
the opinions of doctors and policy makers, forces decision makers to take account of 
objectives according to need, and supports social interconnection and civil identity. This is 
one of the pivotal rights of an individual belonging to a democratic society. Important to note 
is that “public debate should be based on” (Putoto, 2011, p. 65) pertinent and precise 
“information and communication, and be open and transparent with all stakeholders” (Putoto, 
2011, p. 65). A libertarian theory of justice deals with distribution of property based on 
individual liberty and freedom of choice, thus entitlement. Nozick maintains that resources 
should ideally not be allocated by a central distributing authority in a free society (Nozick, 
2013, p. 149). According to him, people should be allowed to confer resources to others 
according to their own desires (Nozick, 2013, p. 223) In this regard Rawls and Nozick have 
totally different and even conflicting world views of what should be considered as justice or 
fairness. For Rawls, each person has an equal right based on basic liberties, whilst in contrast, 
Nozick believes that one simply owns things, and thus has entitlements.  
 
An egalitarian “theory of justice” (Rawls, 2009, p. 302) as described by “Rawls (1971)” in 
“A Theory of Justice” depicts a system of cooperation for equal and fair distribution of goods 
to everyone’s advantage (Rawls, 2009). Rawls relates his theory to equal rights in terms of 
liberty as well as equality of opportunity (Rawls, 2009, p. 302).  
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Norman Daniels created an “egalitarian theory" which expanded Rawls’ “theory of justice” 
into the domain of “health and health care” (Daniels, 2014, p. 599). His egalitarian theory 
serves as a justification to safeguard parity of opportunity through widening the scope by 
introducing policies aimed at sustaining people as near as possible to normal human 
functioning and hence establishing fairness and equality in terms of health (Daniels, 2014, p. 
599). Daniels argues that this will safeguard a person’s fair share of available opportunities in 
society. It is imperative to grant people the opportunity, through normal health and 
functioning, to contribute fully and hence to take part in all domains of life, including social, 
economic as well as political societal life (Daniels, 2014, p. 599).  
 
The association between healthcare and the protection of opportunity suggests distributive 
justice as an appropriate principle of protecting fairness of opportunity. Healthcare is thus of 
special moral significance since it facilitates our status as fully functioning human beings and 
therefore deserves a fair process of rationing (Daniels, 2014, p. 609).  Daniels holds that 
aggregate conditions, circumstances and knowledge gathered during a person’s life create 
health. Thus health is not only created by getting medicine for treatment and prevention 
(Daniels, 2014, p. 611). Managing or preventing any disease, like Gaucher disease, should 
involve holistic medicine, which comprises consideration of the entire individual, including 
physical, psychological, spiritual as well as social circumstances. It also involves well-being, 
quality-of-life as well as the happiness of the person. All these dimensions are interrelated 
and equally significant. One should thus reflect not only on the physical state of the patient 
caused by the disease, but rather regard the patient as a whole, including his or her current 
state-of-mind, emotional circumstances and social environment, thus recognizing the 
individual as an aggregate human being. 
 
Justice underscores the essential equivalence of all human beings. Ronald Dworkin (1977: 
227) distinguishes between “the right to equal treatment” referring to equivalent 
dissemination of resource or opportunity versus “the right to treatment as an equal” ergo “the 
right not to receive the same distribution of benefit, but to be treated with the same respect 
and concern” as everyone else (Dworkin, 1977, p. 227). Dworkin argues that “the right to 
treatment as an equal” is much more fundamental. A Gaucher patient has the right to have an 
equal expectation for treatment in line with the current treatment given to a tuberculosis or 
HIV patient. 
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As soon as one reflects about the correct dissemination of healthcare resources, justice 
develops into an issue. However, it is incomprehensible to grasp why access to expensive 
medicine for treatable conditions such as a rare disease like Gaucher disease should be 
centred exclusively around financial concerns. Moreover, having limitations on expensive 
treatment distribution would place a limitation on further development of orphan medicines 
which may ultimately lower the cost of treatment (Mavroudis, 2015, p. 1624).  “Rights-based 
justice” argues “that a minimum level of health” (Cherry, 2015, p. 56) care is required for 
everyone (Daniels, 1998, p. 316).  
Hughes et al hold “a rights-based approach”, depicting that every person is entitled to 
appropriate adequate healthcare. This necessitates “that treatment is made available for 
managing rare diseases” (Hughes D. , 2005, p. 833). Many patients with rare diseases risk not 
receiving treatment, should access to orphan drugs be denied. The material principle of 
justice pertains to the theory of justice which we believe in (Beauchamp, 2001, p. 58).  
In the health context, the difference principle essentially relates to a commitment to reduce 
health inequalities. Prioritarianism holds that the goodness of an outcome should be related to 
well-being across all patients, and essentially and importantly in specific to worse-off 
patients. Prioritarianism could be reasoned in many different ways and the decision of which 
patient is worst off and deserves health resources over another, can be argued from many 
different angles and begs other questions, e.g. should patients who are not getting worse 
currently receive precedence, however, are these patients not particularly at risk to 
deteriorate? Also, giving absolute priority to the worst off is questionable, when they can 
only experience marginal gains in health-related quality of life (Brock, 2006, p. 263).  
 
Scanlon et al (1997) embrace a contractualist view of “what we owe to each other” or our 
obligations or duties towards other people as rational human beings (Scanlon, 1997).  He 
holds that according to various moral theories, individuals should receive priority for 
treatment based on their individual claims to treatment. Brock further suggests that at a 
minimum, individuals should not be deprived of extremely great health benefits in order to 
provide many patients smaller health benefits (Brock, 2006, p. 264).  
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Should a patient with Gaucher disease be denied treatment due to cost constraints, this poses 
an ethical dilemma related to distributive justice and resource allocation. However, this also 
affects the autonomy of the individual. Autonomy proposes that it is any person’s right to 
choose “what is in their own best interest” (Teutsch, 2012, p. 2). However, autonomy might 
be limited if an individual is exercising his or her right but in the process is limiting the rights 
of others (Teutsch, 2012, p. 2). Though in some instances costly to the healthcare system, 
healthcare providers desire the liberties to decide what they consider is right and best for their 
patients’ well-being as well as to make autonomous choices without any proscriptions 
(Graber, 2005, p. 424).  
Furthermore, a central precept of public health is the requirement that people with certain 
diseases undergo treatment whilst a question might arise why high cost, low patient number 
disease entities like rare diseases may not be receiving the same priorities in terms of 
resource allocation.  These questions, however, cannot be answered without confronting the 
tension between the interests of the individual and those of the collective. The basic 
economic problem is how to maximize health and distribute benefits fairly, but still control 
costs. Powers and Faden are of the notion that the moral justification for health policies 
depends equally as much on wellbeing, as it does on dimension of health (Beauchamp, 2014, 
p. 601). Thus, we need to ask the question whether it is morally right to deny a patient 
treatment when beneficence is considered one of the fundamental principles of healthcare 
ethics and common morality. “Beneficence” denotes the notion of actively doing well or 
being good to others (Beauchamp, 2001, p. 165). This also pertains to making an effort to 
secure a person’s wellbeing and to act in a patient’s best interests (Beauchamp, 2001, pp. 
43,55). Furthermore, the principle of beneficence is dishonored when a healthcare worker 
does not have the right to administer treatment to a patient.  
This also relates primarily to orphan medicines through the concept of non-abandonment.  
“There is no disease so rare that it does not deserve attention” (Orphanet). “Non-
abandonment” is the notion that society recognizes the importance of improving the health of 
patients with rare diseases that are severe and lack alternative treatments (Landman, 1999, p. 
224).   
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More emphasis has been placed on health care because it is required, at some minimum level, 
for any person to function normally. With diminished health, these members of society no 
longer have an equal opportunity. This is why a moral compulsion exists to further orphan 
medicine research and development; without it, a subset of the population’s normal 
functioning and opportunities are restricted.  
Gericke et al (2005: 165) argue that should a person be suffering from a rare and detrimental 
disorder like Gaucher disease with limited availability of treatment, then  “society has a 
moral obligation not to abandon” these patients who have had this “bad luck” or the 
misfortune (Gericke, 2005, p. 165).  
Similar accounts of justice by Dworkin et al argue that people with these disorders should be 
receiving special priority. Dworkin further holds that it is a fundamental right to “be treated 
as an equal” (Dworkin, 1977, p. 227). Refusing to treat a person with an expensive to treat 
condition, should not be an adequate reason to forsake this patient, since it might indicate that 
we only care about cost-effectiveness and not about human beings as such. The argument 
which relates to disregarding one patient’s life or “forsaking a patient” forms part of an 
ongoing utilitarianism versus deontological ethics debate. On the one hand, saving several 
lives versus saving one person and on the other hand the total immorality of killing even one 
patient and where the end never justifies the means.  
In a two-stage Australian survey conducted by Nord et al, a cross-section of individuals were 
questioned regarding the importance of prioritising cost in the healthcare setting. Results 
indicated that merely because one disease is more costly to treat versus other illnesses, any 
patient should not be underprivileged regarding priority for treatment and thus no patient 
should be discriminated against, even if they were unfortunate enough to suffer from a high-
cost disease (Nord, 1995). The authors concluded that the concern with allocative efficiency, 
as usually envisaged by the economists, is not necessarily always shared by the general 
public and furthermore, that the cost-effectiveness approach to assigning priorities in health 
care may be imposing an excessively simple value system upon decision making related to 
resource allocation. 
Linking onto the people born with some or other kind of clinical misfortune, the “rule of 
rescue” proposes a commitment to non-abandonment of individuals with needs for highly 
specialized treatments, even in resource-constrained settings (McKie, 2003, p. 2407) 
(Teutsch, 2012, p. 2) (Kling, 2013, p. 95).  
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The rule of rescue is usually prompted by “identifiable individuals” (such as for instance a 
“group of trapped miners”) (Kling, 2013, p. 95). If a person’s plight, for instance the ultimate 
dire consequences of Gaucher disease without treatment, is made noticeable, then people tend 
to feel more sympathetic towards them.  
 
According to Kling et al an example of a worthy intervention that may be justified by the rule 
of rescue is when treating Gaucher diseases with enzyme replacement therapy  (Kling, 2013, 
p. 95). Since Gaucher disease causes substantial impairment, Cerezyme enzyme replacement 
therapy treatment may restore the patient to full function and therefore render the patient fully 
functional with social capacity as well as a stable economical contributor. Should we abide 
by moral principles and endeavor to restore a patient’s need for flourishing and reaching full 
potential, the reasoning of “equitable rationing” would entail giving everyone with a rare 
disease more or less an equal opportunity to have access to life saving “orphan drugs” 
(Cookson, 2000, p. 329) (Landman, 1999, p. 224).  
Rare diseases like Gaucher disease also have immense economic consequences beyond the 
human toll (Hyry, 2013, p. 1). Individually rare diseases, if not treated, add significant social 
and financial burdens, concerning entire families, since often family members need to care 
for family members afflicted with a rare disease and in the process, forfeit employment. 
However, if patients are treated successfully, it is doubtful whether they would need other 
additional and sometimes even expensive and even traumatic life-saving treatments and 
procedures like analgesia and surgery. They may for example further their studies, be 
employed, earn a decent living and become a key economic contributor and even pay income 
tax on successful careers. When discussing fair allocation of healthcare resources, we should, 
however, bear in mind that money spent on one treatment would then be unavailable for 
another treatment, creating conflict between budgets maximizing the health of the largest part 
of society (Picavet, 2013, p. 572). It is generally accepted that rationing healthcare might be 
more challenging than limiting other commodities, because people believe that healthcare is 
owed to them in principle (Daniels, 1994, p. 27).  However, Dworkin et al argue that 
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The market size of rare diseases is increasing, partly due to the rapid expansion and progress 
of genetics and partly due to new rare diseases constantly being identified (Juth, 2014, p. 3).  
 
As a rule, when looking at the treatment of rare diseases with scarce resources, and being 
cognizant of justice in a healthcare system, every person should receive equal and “sufficient 
of the good” (Juth, 2014, p. 8). Norman Daniels, an expert on healthcare prioritizations, is of 
the notion that it is imperative to ensure that any human “reach the level of health identical to 
the level of normal species functioning” (Juth, 2014, p. 8). He believes that any serious 
disease, regardless of being common or rare, if left untreated, may result in a level far below 
any suggested level of minimal health. However, unfortunately, medicine for rare diseases 
are possibly less likely proffered to patients with rare genetic diseases due to their expenses 
compared to medicines for more common diseases. According to Juth et al the elevated cost 
and smaller patient pool should, however, not “be a morally relevant factor” in deciding 
whether a patient needs access to treatment or not (Juth, 2014, p. 6).  
 
Juth et al believe that although “group size can be plausibly considered to be a factor” in 
terms of morality, he considers “cost or effectiveness” of much higher moral relevance (Juth, 
2014, p. 7). Since genetic rare diseases are low prevalence diseases, if each patient is treated, 
the overall outlay might not be hugely expensive. Also, the same value and consideration that 
is placed on expenditure towards housing and education, should be placed on the health of all 
patients. It is argued by some authors that health deserves distinctive priority (Daniels, 1998). 
I argue that rare diseases also need and deserve more attention. In order to put things further 
into perspective, let us compare cost efficiency of treating Gaucher disease with some other 
medicines for non-rare albeit serious diseases like HIV and tuberculosis. Engelhardt further 
believes that a well-defined, multi-tiered healthcare system constitutes a compromise which 
benefits most healthcare needs in terms of sound medical practice. This however, needs to be 
negotiated through open and honest discussion and fashioned to accommodate diverse 
medical goals. 
 
Scarcity of health care resources will forever remain an inescapable eventuality. Harris is of 
the notion that while healthcare resources are not unlimited, they are also most definitely “not 
finite either”, with expansion a clear possibility, making room for increases in budgets or 
trade-offs against other utilities (Kuhse, 2009, p. 335). In other words, priorities can be 
renegotiated or reassessed.  
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In the following chapter (Chapter 3) some suggestions will be made to assist with the difficult 
decision-making process of resource allocation for a rare disease like Gaucher disease.  
 
The availability of life altering enzyme replacement for Gaucher disease and hence 
improving quality of life for a patient, brings to the forefront questions about deciding 
whether the cost of receiving treatment outweighs the disease’s detrimental and debilitating 
consequences. It also asks the question: what would it be like, for me, to be in this patient’s 
position? The answer is simple. Empirical investigations have shown unequivocally “that 
health is considered to be one of the greatest values in life”. (Nordenfelt, 1993, p. 83)  
It is therefore particularly evident from the preceding literature that even though treatment 
might be costly, most patients with Gaucher disease, if untreated, may suffer from various 
degrees of severely disabling physical and emotional issues. These could have an immense 
detrimental effect on a patient’s quality of life and thus potentially prevent a human from 
reaching their utmost potential or flourishing. The following section will delve deeper into 
the ethical dimensions of quality of life (or alternatively phrased happiness). 
 
1.4 Ethical dimensions of happiness or alternatively phrased quality of life 
for patients with Gaucher disease 
 
The concept of “quality of life” is used to refer to a “state of being” of an individual, 
particularly portraying a positive or negative deviation from “human flourishing” (Rachels, 
2003). In other words, quality of life may depict, amongst others, certain prerequisites with 
the purpose of becoming (more fully) human.  
Many philosophers, including Aristotle, Plato, Bentham, Mill and others, have attested that 
the best human life is due to happiness. In addition, numerous philosophical theories have 
been published referring to quality of life as “an account of what makes human life worth 
living” (Rachels, 2003) (Lea, 2005, p. 234) (Pera, 2011, p. 42). 
 
The three most recognised categories of theories related to quality of life are theories of 
human flourishing, hedonic theories and rational preference theories (Nussbaum, 1993).  
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Jennings et al hold that holistically, theories of human flourishing attempt to ground our 
comprehension “of the good life on an account of those functions, capacities, and excellences 
that make us most completely and entirely human” (Hughes J. , 2003, p. 528) (Jennings, 
2002) (Diener, 2006, p. 305). Consequently, flourishing as a human being, is not only the 
extent to which “we attain and master those capacities”, but also the extent to which “we 
avoid those conditions” that would impede “those capacities” (Jennings, 2002). Conversely, 
hedonic theories identify quality of life explicitly with happiness or pleasure.  
 
Finally, quality of life with reference to “actual satisfaction” or realisation “of a person’s 
rational desires or preferences” is depicted by rational preference theories (Jennings, 2002). 
According to Jennings et al, all these theories are controversial in nature. Yet, despite its 
ambiguity, the concept of quality of life remains essential, particularly in the sphere “of 
health care and social services” (Jennings, 2002). The concept of quality of life closely 
parallels the notion of happiness and involves our entire existence. Constanza et al believe 
that quality of life “is a multidimensional construct emerging from the evaluation of multiple 
needs” and obviously, “each need is assumed to contribute in varying degrees to overall” 
quality of life of the individual (Constanza, 2007, p. 272). 
 
Ancient Greek history depicts various different definitions of happiness and in addition the 
ability of a person to reach his or her utmost potential (McMahon, 2006). Plato’s notion of a 
happy life was that it must satisfy at least three conditions. The Nicomachean ethics teaches 
us that life must be desirable for its own sake, sufficient of itself to satisfy us and it must be 
the life that a wise man would prefer to any other life (Aristotle, 384–322 B.C.). According to 
Aristotle (384 B.C. – 322 B.C.) the best life is one filled with happiness or “Eudaimonia”.  
Thus, Aristotle believed that “happiness is the highest good and the end to which all our 
activities ultimately should aim” (Thomson, 2004). Aristotle’s notion of happiness mainly 
rests on ourselves, and encompasses our life in entirety. Aristotle further held that there are 
three kinds of contingencies that can affect our happiness, namely pleasure, wealth and 
honour. These encompass eventualities during our birth and life and even after our life. 
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Importantly, if we are suffering from a lack of health or deterred from optimal functioning 
because of illness, we cannot live a fulfilled life of satisfaction. If a patient is forced to endure 
continuous pain, such as the debilitating bone pain of a patient with Gaucher disease, 
reaching full potential may be somewhat more challenging.  
 
Aristotle believed a worthwhile definition of human well-being and hence happiness is to live 
an active, worthwhile and complete life. Added to this, for Aristotle, a complete life shows 
that potential not crowned by accomplishment is not enough to consider an individual’s life 
exultant and content. Thus, the virtue or excellence of a man is if he can live his own life to 
the utmost of his ability and potential (Taylor, 1955, p. 91). The ultimate happiness for 
Aristotle is to obtain a virtuous character. A person lacking health and wellness will 
experience less wellbeing as well as worsening of emotional and physical welfare. Thus, 
unquestionably, a Gaucher patient with bone complications might experience reduced quality 
of life and therefore less happiness, which might even ultimately lead to a negative social 
impact and potentially a reduction in economic earning potential (Belmatoug, 2012) 
 
Aristotle’s “activity-oriented theory of the good life” has apparently not excessively affected 
present-day welfare philosophers. Generally, a broad-based utilitarian approach seems to be 
the overwhelming preference. It seems as if a moral rationalization for withholding funding 
to specific medicine is certainly lacking, bar the excuse of lack of resources to fund a wide 
spectrum of disease entities. As previously alluded to, according to the great utilitarian 
philosopher, Jeremy Bentham (1784-1832), “individual human happiness consists of 
achieving a greater balance of pleasure over pain for the greatest number of people” 
(Stangroom, 2012, p. 84).  
 
However, this can only be done if there is a distinct way of comparing pleasures with 
pleasures and pains with pains and pleasures with pain (Stangroom, 2012, p. 84). Keeping in 
mind that concurring with Bentham's principle of utility, this obviously refers to the notion of 
increasing happiness or satisfaction in a person or a group people. Bentham’s notion revolves 
around an action which must either be based on an aspiration for pleasure or a craving to 
avoid pain, differentiating Bentham as a representative of the school of psychological 
hedonism (Nordenfelt, 1993, p. 24).  
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Bentham’s practical solution to compare pain and pleasure in different situations, was a kind 
of “hedonistic calculus” which he claims will not only quantify pleasure, but also offers a 
system for its qualification, measuring amongst others, pleasure’s duration, intensity, purity, 
certainty, fecundity and extent. He also considers the demerits of different kinds of pain and 
admits that pleasure and pains are relative to the perceiver and their education, religion and 
social standing. Thus, according to Bentham, we must “sum up all the values of the pleasures 
on the one side, and those of the pains on the other” (Nordenfelt, 1993, p. 24). Should the 
balance lean predominantly towards the pleasure side, this will obviously indicate 
satisfaction.  
 
Utilitarians believe that not only does the morality of the action solely matter on the 
consequences of the action, but that the actions matter only as long as they involve the 
greater/lesser happiness of individuals. They further believe that each individual’s happiness 
should get equal consideration. According to Rachels et al, “happiness is the only thing 
desirable as an end, whilst all other things being only desirable as a means” (Rachels, 2003, 
p. 114). For utilitarians, happiness is pleasure. They identify happiness/pleasure generally to 
include all mental states that feel good. This concurs somewhat with the hedonistic school of 
thought, which focuses on elements of pleasure and pain. However, the main notion of 
utilitarianism is irreconcilable with the ideal of justice. According to the notion of 
utilitarianism, deeds are justified if happiness largely surpasses unhappiness even by 
repudiating the rights of people in the process, purely because this practice results in good 
results for the most people or society at large. Thus, seemingly for utilitarians the pleasure of 
the majority clearly outweighs the suffering of the one.  
 
Thus, if we carefully reflect on the ethical reasoning behind “Bentham's principle of utility” 
(Rachels, 2003), it suggests that actions promoting or decreasing pleasure or happiness of a 
person or a group of persons should be assessed and that we should ultimately abstain from 
actions which do not have the same good consequences for society as a whole. In other 
words, utilitarianism depicts the notion that acts are considered to be right only if they 
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Therefore, there is no place for individual rights in utilitarianism and this notion thus limits 
treatment of the individual, regardless of the good accomplished. However, should we not 
rather endeavour to examine each patient’s case on an individual basis, acknowledging that 
each patient has an inherent right to a happy and fulfilled quality of life in order to realise 
their individual potential? Even though seemingly impossible to articulate the deepest 
dimensions of life, we somehow need to optimise and harness each individual’s potential to 
enable them to live a full, good and happy life. Optimal treatment to enhance a patients’ 
quality of life may certainly be a step in the right direction. 
 
Harris et al describe the degree of need for healthcare as the importance, urgency or intensity 
of need, together with the amount of that which is vital and ultimately “the capacity of 
benefit” derived from fulfilling an individual patient’s need (Kuhse, 2009, p. 336).  
Fulfillment of need could, however, further be described in terms of duration of satisfaction 
once the need is fulfilled, as well as the patient’s capacity to benefit from the supply to satisfy 
his/her need. The intricacy is to decide which of the previous dimensions implore greater 
necessity for treatment to make resource allocation more compelling for one treatment over 
another. One important dimension of this equation is to reflect on what a patient stands to 
lose if left untreated. What would the influence be on quality of life of a patient or how does 
one optimally assess the lack of quality of life? Assessment of loss of quality of life should 
definitely comprise of a multidimensional approach, taking into consideration numerous 
measures (Nussbaum, 1993). It should be evaluated on an individual basis rather than with a 
multi-focused utilitarian approach, which takes into consideration happiness for the greatest 
number of people versus happiness for an individual.  
 
Morally speaking, so long as the quality of life is worth having for the person who is living 
the life, people’s lives and fundamental welfares should essentially receive equivalent ratings, 
irrespective of life expectancy, quality of life, age and other differentiating factors. Treat 
equals as equals. Although diseases each have a clinical component, judgment can clearly not 
only be made on one single dimension, but should be based on a fair and equitable 
assessment of all known and relevant facts. Harris believes that each life should be counted as 
one. No more and no less (Kuhse, 2009, p. 348). Each individual, including a patient with 
Gaucher disease, is a moral entity with equal moral worth.  
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Compared with any other person, each patient with Gaucher disease should be offered a 
realistic and reasonable chance to receive treatment. Justice and fairness entail that we should 
at least endeavour to present an individual the possibility of prosperous living and happiness.  
 
Analogous to other rare diseases, Gaucher disease, if diagnosed at all, is often diagnosed long 
after symptoms have appeared (Mistry, 2007, p. 697). A delay in diagnosis carries immense 
costs, not only by preventing an individual from receiving timely treatment and thus suffering 
from unnecessary long-term detrimental side-effects, but also by increasing time spent on the 
exhausting odyssey of multiple diagnostic tests (Weinreb N. , 2008, p. 890). Genetic testing 
may afford these patients an equal opportunity to attain their full capability as human beings.  
The next section will address the importance of genetic testing of rare diseases and the ethical 




2.1 Genetic diseases and the advent of genetic testing 
 
Scientific technology has brought about immense advances in human prosperity, including 
genetics, determination of DNA and the possibility of prediction of inheriting a rare genetic 
disease (Economist, The effect of today’s technology on tomorrow’s jobs will be immense—
and no country is ready for it, 2014). “Watson and Crick”, who “discovered the existence of 
DNA in 1953” (Portin, 2014, p. 293), count amongst some of the most famous men in 
modern biology and were rightly, rewarded a Nobel Prize for the immensity of their 
discovery (Portin, 2014, p. 293).  
 
Genetic science and genetic engineering today present us with immeasurable opportunities 
and possibilities (Rosen, 2011). It has revolutionised not only the ways in which we seek to 
understand the world and ourselves, but also our attempts to change the world (by 
engineering outcomes barely conceivable until now). In the modern era of genetic medicine, 
there exists the possibility of access to a novel kind of knowledge pertaining to our own 
micro-cosmos of genes. This new opportunity provides the prospect to know about future 
harm or detriment that may come to you or your blood relations in the form a genetic disease 
like Gaucher disease (Aber, 1998, pp. 77-95) (Berry, 2007, pp. 1-4).  




Although genetic testing (determination of some genetic factor in an individual) and genetic 
screening (to ascertain prevalence of some genetic factor in a population or population group, 
usually as part of a public health program) have numerous ethical issues in common, they are 
different in scope (Chadwick, 2008, p. 160). Both of these procedures are linked with 
particular sensitivities, especially in light of the history of genetics and its abuse in eugenics 
(Chadwick, 2008, p. 160). 
 
 
2.2 Genetic testing, disclosure of genetic information and autonomy 
 
Genetic testing, although somewhat novel, has made huge advances in the scientific domain 
during the past few years. Advancing knowledge of genetic disorders like Gaucher disease 
has created a host of ethical and social dilemmas associated with genetics (Gross, 2002, p. 
151) (Beutler, 1993, p. 5384). For instance, individuals subjected to genetic testing have 
created considerable debate especially pertaining to ethical and moral concerns (Borry, 2008, 
p. 139).  As soon as an individual is classified either through family history and/or clinical 
signs and symptoms as having a genetic disorder, their chance of developing the disease may 
be elucidated by undergoing a genetic testing procedure. The decision to undergo a genetic 
test is based on autonomy and is a choice that each person needs to make by him/herself. This 
should, however, be based on an informed decision. In children, genetic testing for conditions 
that will only show symptoms in adulthood, like type 1 Gaucher disease, it is advised that the 
decision to test should be postponed until adulthood, to ensure that the decision is made 
maturely.  
 
Where familial genetic disease is common, parents may ask for genetic testing in children. 
These requests might create a predicament for paediatricians. Testing of some adult-onset 
diseases may show benefit in childhood because of early detection and treatment or 
alternatively, a negative test result may bring comfort and relief to the parents (Charlisse, 
2012, p. 163).  If no medical cure or medical benefit is available for a disease that will only 
develop in adulthood, the international genetic society guidelines recommend not to test 
based on the notion that a child has a right to autonomy.  
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This also eliminates the decision to be made in adulthood (Malpas, 2005, p. 273).  Each 
individual can base the decision on their moral beliefs and preferences. They can decline or 
give consent to the genetic test being done. Before decisions to test are made, all relevant 
information about the desired and possible outcomes of the test and likely choices that might 
arise, must be considered. Only test children if the goal is to improve medical care 
(CanadianPaediatricSociety, 2003, p. 42) 
 
Parents and families, as well as the affected individual with the rare disease often feel 
overwhelmed by all the medical details. They need counselling to understand the genetic and 
familial implications of genetic contributions of the disease as well as future inheritance 
patterns and the impact on future pregnancies. Therefore, psychosocial support is pivotal in 
addressing fears and rationalisation in order for patients and family members to make sense 
of their situation (Glass, 2016). Genetic counsellors therefore play a pivotal educational and 
information-imparting role as well as an emotionally and practically supporting role. In this 
way, people can make their own decisions based on their beliefs and wishes that are firmly 
grounded in biological reality (Kuhse, 2009, p. 245).  
 
Since genetic information can clearly be correlated to a person’s identity, it is considered 
confidential. The receipt of diagnostic information changes patients’ ethical responsibilities 
and their understanding of their own ethical position (Aber, 1998, p. 84). Numerous ethical 
questions may arise from genetic testing. A person's DNA is unique, excluding identical 
twins. However, simultaneously, relatives or unknown relatives may discover undisclosed 
genetic information about themselves, should previously unknown knowledge of genetic 
information about a certain individual be made public (Durfy, 2001) .  
 
“Privacy and confidentiality of genetic information present perplexing and challenging issues 
that could result in devastating effects for individuals, families, community and society”  
(Lea, 2005, p. 236) (ACOG, 2008 (Reaffirmed 2014)). Some examples of these issues 
include amongst others, breaking physician-patient confidentiality by sharing private health 
information (e.g. genetics) about the patient to third parties without the patient’s consent. 
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This may not only detrimentally affect future relationships with other potentially affected 
family members, but may also lead to discrimination by for instance health insurers.    
 
Patient and social welfare necessitate rules of confidentiality based on the well-known 
principles of privacy and respect for autonomy. Individuals’ decisions to control access to 
information about them should be respected. If the patient refrains from passing on the 
relevant information to family members, the question arises whether the genetic counsellor 
may justifiably break confidentiality under the circumstances? Serious problems could ensue, 
should private and personal information be divulged through a family network contrary to the 
family’s wishes. Inadvertent disclosure of information about a patient’s condition or genetic 
predisposition to other members is a hazard and must be guarded against at all cost (Kuhse, 
2009, p. 246). People may also fear that genetic screening will lead to the family making 
choices related to procreation, focused on the genetics of the child. The community and 
society may, also often not understand the consequences of the rare disease, often because of 
lack of awareness. By having a diagnostic label, genetic discrimination in health insurance or 
even societal stigmatisation could occur (Durfy, 2001).  
 
To preserve the principle of non-maleficence (to do no harm) and the principle of beneficence 
(to do good), a careful assessment of risks and benefits is necessary. According to Lea et al 
the principles of non-maleficence and beneficence similarly relate to the choice to undergo 
genetic testing which might uncover previously unknown genetic information about a 
pregnant mother and her offspring (Lea, 2005, p. 236). The clinician should always point out 
uses and limitations of a test in order to comply with adequate informed consent procedures. 
In Mrs. X’s case, this would include conversing with her in the language she is most 
comfortable with to provide proper information and a balanced view of potential benefits and 
harms in order to make a proper informed choice.  
 
However, one should still be cognizant of the fact that knowing the probability of inheriting a 
gene mutation does not necessarily lead to an explanation of the severity of the condition 
(“variable expression”), or explicit presence at all (“variable penetrance”). However, globally 
there is a move towards expansion of prenatal testing (Ross, 2008, p. 104). Some background 
on the genetics of Gaucher disease will elucidate associated concomitant ethical dilemmas.  
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When someone like Mrs. X is afflicted with a genetic heritable condition, the whole family is 
involved. Hence, although difficult, it is still imperative that the risk between relatives is 
clearly communicated. However, many aspects influence decisions of disclosure of 
information, even within a closely knit family group (Gallo, 2009, p. 65). According to Gallo 
et al, the most often encountered motives reported for revelation of information to family 
members or relatives comprise an apparent obligation, need or responsibility towards for 
instance her partner to disclose (Gallo, 2009, p. 65) (Forrest, 2003). These women are thus 
faced with an important balancing act between responsibility and autonomy: whether to give 
information which might negatively influence future lives versus regard for others “having a 
right to information which may facilitate their future health management decisions” 
(Hallowell, 2003, p. 75). 
 
 
Thus, additional ethical questions, regarding genetic screening may arise from the case study 
of Mrs. X: Should the partner/spouse (biological father) of the pregnant patient (diagnosed 
with Gaucher disease) also be tested for Gaucher disease? In this instance, Mrs. X has 
Gaucher disease. If her partner is a carrier of Gaucher disease, chances that the baby also has 
the disease is vastly increased, in actual fact almost 50% (Refer to Figure 1 “Inheriting 
Gaucher Disease”).  
 
However, the partner/spouse has a right to privacy and might not necessarily want to consent 
to genetic testing. Protection of privacy of the results may result in other family members 
being unaware of their own risk (ACOG, 2008 (Reaffirmed 2014)). Thus, one of the other 
burning issues that a patient with Gaucher disease also needs to reflect on is disclosure of 
genetic information (Borry, 2008, p. 139).  
 
The dilemmas of disclosure of genetic traits to a spouse or partner are intensely personal and 
confront both patients and carriers (regardless of known or potential carriers of genetic 
disease). In the case study, Mrs. X faces the challenge of whether disclosure is obligatory or 
not. A partner consummating marriage with the intent on raising a family may insist on open 
disclosure, which in turn “creates an obligation to seek genetic information and a duty to” 
divulge this “information to prospective” partners (Gross, 2002, p. 152).  
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By testing both Mrs. X and her partner for Gaucher disease, a physician can now ensure early 
treatment with enzyme replacement therapy for both the pregnant mother and, if necessary, 
also to her partner. This could allow them the possibility of a considerable increase of current 
quality of life and hence assist them to live a longer, and socially as well as economically, a 
more productive life (Weinreb N. , 2002, p. 112) (Hayes, 1998, p. 521) (Masek, 1999, p. 
263). 
 
Respect for patient autonomy is important (Gillon, 2003, p. 307) (Varelius, 2006, p. 377) 
(Beauchamp, 2001, p. 176). The “principle of respect for autonomy” is most commonly 
associated with “enabling patients to make their own decisions about which” health care 
“interventions they will or will not receive” (Beauchamp, 2001, p. 176). In addition, the 
notion of autonomy further changes dramatically during a pregnancy scenario which requires 
a careful balancing act weighing between the actual physical risks to the pregnant woman 
versus potential benefits or harms for her foetus. Post-partum this balance shifts to weigh the 
child’s interests against the psychological, spiritual or economic interests of the child’s 
family (Lantos, 2008, p. 95). The decision to undergo a genetic test is based on autonomy and 
is a choice that each person needs to make. This should, however, be based on an informed 
decision (Lea, 2005, p. 234).  The “importance of autonomy in decisions about reproduction 
and genetic testing is” emphasized “in modern bioethics” (Kuhse, 2009, p. 246). This 
emphasis on autonomy is particularly demonstrated through the pivotal importance of 
informed decision making and consent pertaining to healthcare.  
 
According to Hildt et al, autonomy incorporates multiple “aspects such as self-determination, 
free decision-making, and self-creation” (Hildt, 2009, p. 143). A fundamental part of 
autonomy is an individual’s capability to contemplate his or her values and partialities and 
thus to shape his or her existence correspondingly (Hildt, 2009, p. 143). Autonomous 
decision-making for a patient involves sufficient access to health-related information so that 
he/she can decide at will and in the absence of external constraints on the further course of 
treatment (Hildt, 2009, p. 143). The “impact of the information obtained in predictive genetic 
testing” as opposed to informed-consent related situations on individual autonomy is however 
multifaceted and “much less defined”, since repercussions of the genetic test results on for 
instance the individual’s future as well as individual preferences have to be carefully 
considered (Hildt, 2009, p. 144).   
 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
57 
 
In an effort to uphold their obligations of care and yet preserve autonomy, genetic screening 
forces women to adopt different strategies. For an individual, by applying autonomy, you 
actuate the direction and continuity of your life plans and accept accountability for your 
actions/decisions. Paramount to autonomy, an individual should have the ability to know 
what he or she prefers, aligning this to his or her values and to subsequently change his or her 
life accordingly. Individual autonomy is important when referring to genetic testing. One 
should ideally not only concentrate on medical treatment, however, all options and measures 
to prevent the effect that the test results will have on future lifestyle choices, personal beliefs 
and long-term desires should be taken into consideration. Additionally, options that include 
the freedom to make informed decisions as well as realising the impact of the decision on 
future lifestyle, family, society and religious conditions in your personal sphere should be 
taken into consideration (Hildt, 2009, p. 143). 
 
In order to delve deeper into an ethical appraisal of genetic screening for Gaucher disease, it 
is important to provide an overview of what this practice entails. As soon as an individual is 
classified either through genetic inheritance and/or clinical signs and symptoms at risk for a 
genetic disorder, their predisposition to develop the disorder may be elucidated through 
genetic testing. The capability of researchers to investigate through genetic screening 
processes for particular genetic irregularities and malformations has directed researchers to 
three instances in which the ethics of genetic screening are clearly elucidated: embryo, 
neonatal and fetal screening, as well as carrier screening, and testing for economic reasons.  
Pertinent to this particular case study and thesis, is pre-natal screening and carrier screening, 
hence the following discussion will deal mostly with those. 
 
The possibility of being a carrier for certain genetic defects, are elucidated through carrier 
screening. This will clarify to prospective parents the likelihood of both or either of the 
parents being a carrier for a particular genetic defect. “Carrier screening can reduce the 
burden of genetic disease, especially in populations at risk” (Rosner, 2009, p. 8.6) (Vallance, 
2003, p. 473). Ideally, carrier screening is performed preconception because this allows for 
greater decision-making latitude (Ross, 2008, p. 104).  
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A study by Borry et al raised some difficult questions regarding the appropriateness of a 
“carrier screening” program “for type 1 Gaucher disease” (Borry, 2008, p. 139). There is 
convincing evidence versus carrier screening for  Gaucher disease since the disease course is 
highly variable (Rosenbaum, 2015, p. 549). However, affected patients can, with screening 
identification and early diagnosis, be effectively treated with enzyme replacement therapy 
(Weinreb N. , 2002, p. 112). Generally speaking, autonomy or “the right to know” is 
considered pivotal “to situations in which appropriate preventive or therapeutic measures can 
be taken, or to those in which the result is relevant to family planning decisions” (Hildt, 2009, 
p. 146).  
 
The principle of autonomy particularly regarding predictive genetic testing is of fundamental 
significance as to deciding whether to undergo predictive genetic testing. However, it is 
equally relevant to gain knowledge and insight which might possibly influence an 
individual’s life in future (Hildt, 2009, p. 147). In the Case study of Mrs. X, a further 
argument can be made that genetic screening may well afford couples with knowledge and 
control. This is confirmed by Zuckerman et al who stated that genetic screening will “allow 
couples at risk to be identified and to make an informed choice” (Zuckerman, 2007, p. 1290). 
Genetic screening provides parents with the desire to reproduce with useful, although limited 
information regarding the possibility of a genetic defect of an offspring. The limitations of 
genetic screening are that these tests can often not accurately predict if the affected individual 
will present with symptoms of the disease, the severity of the symptoms of the disease, or 
disease outcome. Genetic test results may be inconclusive in ultimately determining a 
patient’s risk. 
 
It may also afford couples the opportunity to decide not to procreate, to adopt a child or to go 
through a process of in vitro fertilization (IVF). They may even decide, after careful 
consideration, to screen embryos or to abort the affected fetus after discovering that they both 
are carriers of a recessive genetic defect like Gaucher disease. 
 
In view of particular results, certain individuals may make “involuntary” decisions, such as 
“abandoning certain valued pursuits” or feeling unable to make choices like deciding not to 
procreate (Hildt, 2009, p. 148).  
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According to Hildt et al, the individual, left with a substantial reduction in existing options, 
may hence be forced to make “inauthentic choices”, resulting in a substantial limitation of 
“individual autonomy” (Hildt, 2009, p. 148). In order to curtail anxiety associated with 
choice and responsibility, an individual might sometimes make a decision underpinned by 
sociocultural influences, such as peer pressure. Thus, the person might not be properly 
appraising universal, personal and holistic implications, but prevailing to norms in the 
decision-making process. Thus, by making the comfortable decision and failing to recognise 
that there is indeed a huge variety of choices available, the person may be compromising their 
individual autonomy. 
 
One of the natural instincts of most couples is to conceive flawless children free from the 
burden of any disorder. This has led to the advent of embryo, neonatal and fetal screening in 
the womb which has “been designed to identify infants with severe disorders that are 
relatively prevalent and treatable (or controllable)” (Dhondt, 2010, p. S211). Newborn 
screening (NBS) is a population-based program that seeks to screen newborn babies for 
early-onset, treatable disorders (Ross, 2008, p. 105). Prenatal testing involves a number of 
different tests including genetic carrier testing, “ultrasound, amniocentesis or chorionic villus 
sampling (CVS) or preimplantation genetic diagnosis” (Ross, 2008, p. 104).  
Especially in Western society, pre-natal screening for genetic impairment is progressively 
considered as a regular practice (Press, 1997, p. 980). Early detection of Gaucher disease is 
vital for both patients and their relatives and represents justification for instituting NBS 
(Wang, 2011, p. 459). It is also clear that earlier initiation of therapy can make a substantial 
difference in the outcome of the disease progression (Wang, 2011). In the United States, 
every newborn partakes in NBS for at least twenty-nine disorders, where evidence suggests 
that early detection is possible and beneficial (Matern, 2015, p. 206).  
 
Lisi et al conducted thirty-eight telephonic interviews with genetic healthcare providers to 
investigate whether NBS of lysosomal storage diseases (LSDs) were appropriate (Lisi, 2016, 
p. 373). Results indicated that amongst the “LSDs discussed, Pompe was considered most 
appropriate” for NBS and “Krabbe least appropriate”, whilst Fabry and Gaucher disease were 
viewed less favourably due to later onset of disease (Lisi, 2016, p. 373).  
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It seems that the main argument against genetic screening is that as humans, we are not privy 
to universal knowledge (Thompson, 1999, p. 263). However, the universal truth is that 
genetic screening seems to be accepted as a norm in society today. The use of pre-natal 
testing has thus become accepted over the past 20 years (Thompson, 1999, p. 263). Expanded 
programs raised novel ethical questions. One of the arguments against screening is the risk of 
discrimination or stigmatization (De Montalembert, 2005, p. 528). Some individuals might 
think that genetic screening may confer unfair discrimination on those individual persons 
who might be perceived as possessing “inferior” genes.  
 
Parents may also experience anxiety resulting from a false positive test or residual “anxiety 
about the current health of their carrier child and their future reproductive decision making” 
(Duff, 2008) (Lewis, 2006, p. 533), respect for autonomy of individuals to come to their own 
conclusions about choices, as well as apprehensions about medicalization during the neonatal 
period (Dhondt, 2010, p. S215). “Couples whose older children were born before screening 
may also become anxious regarding their up-to-now” healthy children (Zuckerman, 2007, p. 
1282). Unanticipated medical tests and evaluations may be conducted on adults with 
asymptomatic Gaucher disease who have now been identified through screening (Zuckerman, 
2007, p. 1282). Chadwick et al held that in addition to creating uncertainty and anxiety, some 
patients might also experience low self-esteem (Chadwick, 1997, p. 13).  
 
Some authors like Takala et al suggest that an individual is personally responsible to obtain 
all relevant information through genetic screening and to decide whether the benefits of 
gathering this information outweighs the risks (Takala, 2000, p. 171).  
 
 
2.4 Genetic screening and ethical theory  
 
Rhodes et al propose that in order to advance society’s knowledge of population genetics, 
carriers of rare genetic diseases are obliged to undergo genetic screening (Rhodes, 1998, p. 
23). Data from both carriers and non-carriers are imperative in this instance and societal 
benefit clearly outweighs the disadvantages to any individual, which is in support of 
utilitarianism.  
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In the example of prediction of familial hypercholesterolemia in a susceptible population, 
preventative measures instilled earlier may lead to pro-active lifestyle and dietary changes 
including incorporating other holistic measures. Knowledge of a predisposition may prevent 
or ameliorate some of the consequences of the future disease and allow the affected society to 
make informed choices timeously. 
 
Historically, utilitarianism, which was initially proposed by David Hume and later on firmly 
established by both Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill describes the moral goodness of 
actions by their consequences (Lea, 2005, p. 234) (Pera, 2011, p. 42) (Rachels, 2003). 
According to these philosophers, the acts considered to be right “produce the greatest 
happiness for the greatest number of people” (Rachels, 2003). Utilitarianism was developed 
in England during the Enlightenment Era, more or less at the time of the Industrial 
Revolution, by the eccentric lawyer, “philosopher and social reformer Jeremy Bentham 
(1748-1832)” (Rachels, 2003). Bentham was specifically interested in social and political 
reform, most notably in criminal law. Bentham already formulated his principle of utility as 
early as 1780; however, his theoretical basis for utilitarianism was only published in 1789 in 
his “Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation” (Rachels, 2003). Applied to 
genetics and subsequently a rare genetic disease like Gaucher disease, utilitarianism broadly 
supports genetic testing, genetic selection, gene therapy and genetic enhancement of 
offspring, aiming at enhancing the opportunity of such individuals to enjoy the best lives, but 
also to lessen the burden on society (Fulda, 2006, p. 145).  
 
Prior knowledge of a genetic disease and prevention of parents unknowingly passing on the 
genetic disorder by not having children may lessen the burden on society that often needs to 
pay high costs for expensive treatments (Fulda, 2006, p. 145). Through genetic testing and 
screening and notifying at risk family members may not only delay onset of symptoms 
through early medical intervention but may also decrease the duration and extent of 
symptoms (Fulda, 2006). Furthermore, through sufficient preparation and appropriate 
lifestyle changes this may impact on the quality of life. By allowing family members to 
undergo genetic screening and to make informed choices that may influence the future of 
their families, the knowledge could also enable them to make informed decisions about 
“passing on the genetic defect” (Fulda, 2006, p. 145).  
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The moral theory of utilitarianism yields a principle (beneficence), with the following rule in 
mind: net aggregate of good for the majority of persons, with a total result of absolutely 
minimal suffering. The principle of beneficence rests on actions done to promote only good 
and well-being of others. Utilitarianism states that under any given circumstances, “we 
should do what will have the best overall consequences for everyone concerned” (Kuhse, 
2009, p. 15). Thus, for utilitarians, the ultimate moral principle is the principle of utility, 
which is all about pleasure and satisfaction of human needs. This sounds great, since almost 
everyone would agree that well-being is most certainly a primary end goal for any individual 
on earth. In contrast with Kantianism, utilitarianism is not about pleasing God or being 
faithful to abstract rules.  Utilitarianism is all about making the world as happy and content as 
possible. 
Bentham held that since human beings essentially are primarily pain-pleasure organisms, 
morality and political philosophy should thus hinge on minimizing pain. So, any action is 
good if it leads to human happiness and bad if it interferes with the happiness of others. 
Could one thus venture to ask the question: what is happiness? And how can it be quantified 
or measured? Doesn’t happiness mean different things to different people? Or are there even 
different degrees of happiness? Bentham believed that one should ultimately ensure “the 
greatest amount of happiness to the greatest number of people”. Thus, in the end with 
utilitarianism, the consequences or most importantly, the absolute best outcome for the most 
people involved, are what matters most. 
John Mill believed that utilitarianism should ultimately focus on general happiness, 
regardless of whether this will increase one’s own happiness, thus, closely linking 
utilitarianism with the ethics of Christianity and altruism (Paley, 1785, p. 56). Interestingly, 
Nietzsche on the other hand criticized utilitarianism by querying “the psychological 
possibility of the sort of disinterested altruism he perceived that utilitarians endorse” 
(Anomaly, 2005, p. 5). 
 
Since the first origin of Bentham’s theory, a few different branches of utilitarianism have 
evolved, namely “act utilitarianism” (by direct appeal to the utility principle it disregards 
rules and justifies actions), rule utilitarianism (considering consequences of adopting certain 
rules), negative utilitarianism (morally right and wrong actions depend solely on the 
consequences for total well-being) and two-level utilitarianism (moral decisions primarily 
based on intuitive moral rules except in rare instances where critical reasoning is involved). 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
63 
 
These different branches use different approaches to maximize happiness and pleasure. 
However, the underlying principle remains the same. Happiness for the majority reigns 
supreme. Perhaps a few questions might arise concerning the universal applicability of 
Utilitarianism. Although happiness seems to be universal, the theoretical model of 
Utilitarianism seems to be more applicable for public policy than to clinical medical ethics 
and that barring the very good intentions of utilitarianism the practical case-by-case 
implementation in each and every instance may be fraught with difficulty. Average 
utilitarianism depicts choosing the act that capitalises on utility (individual good) per 
individual; aggregate utilitarianism says select the act that augments the totality of utility 
across individuals.  
 
An argument can also be made that genetic screening could assist by increasing the future 
prospects of Gaucher disease patients if timeously identified and diagnosed. This may have a 
major impact on the potential of the individual with regards to their participation in the 
family and in the community. Buchanan et al hold that “protecting normal biological 
functioning is not an end in itself” (Buchanan, 2000, p. 81). When we preserve people’s 
normal functioning, this maintains their ability to participate and contribute to “social, 
political, and economic life” (Buchanan, 2000).  Fully functioning individuals can also totally 
participate and compete as normal citizens in all domains of social life (Buchanan, 2000). 
Persad et al even hold that resource allocation might be dependent on usefulness of a person 
(Persad, 2009, p. 423). This means that reflection might be given to awarding resources on 
the basis of future usefulness of a person and on whose “continued existence is clearly 
required.” Thus, if properly treated patients with Gaucher disease can make a significant 
social and economic contribution, closely linking the greater societal benefit to utilitarianism. 
 
Conversely, however, genetic screening can also bring about some other potential ethical 
dilemmas, for instance the possibility of data mining of genetic information (especially those 
with hereditary diseases) could pose “an underlying threat to medical and health-related 
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It is apparent that based on a “rights-based moral theory”, that every individual has particular 
“moral or natural rights” (Breakey, 2015). This includes, amongst others, the right to life and 
the right to privacy. “Rights based theories” comprise “entitlement” as well as “positive 
rights” which assert that we are entitled to particular rights for example, healthcare (Breakey, 
2015). Negative rights are also included, which impart “the freedom to do something without 
interference from others” like, for instance “the abuse of genetic information” by third parties 
might interfere with individuals’ rights to keep medical information private and it also 
intervenes with an individual’s “rights to apply for jobs that have reasonable insurance 
coverage”  (Breakey, 2015).  
 
 
Should Mrs. X for instance apply for a job, the underlying threat of Gaucher disease 
detrimentally influencing her health and wellbeing, might count against her in being 
successful in her application in obtaining the position, even though this is directly against 
government policy and infringing on her human rights. Some employers might also suffer 
from “genetic fatalism” which gives them a grossly exaggerated view of genetic outcomes. 
“Genetic fatalism” is associated with the belief that genetic outcomes is determined, and 
above all, fixed and unchangeable. Thus, employers might have the same (somewhat 
misguided belief) like Watson, “quoted in Time Magazine” (Jaroff, 1989, p. 62).  
 
"We used to think our fate was in our stars. Now we know, in large measure, our fate is in 
our genes" (Jaroff, 1989, p. 62) (Alper, 1993, pp. 511, 513).  Employers may overlook hiring 
a potential job contender with “a genetic link to” Gaucher disease, despite that individual’s 
potential performance value (Guttmacher, 2003, p. 562). This is notwithstanding the fact that 
for patients with type 1 Gaucher disease, the clinical course and life expectancy are extremely 
“variable, encompassing a spectrum ranging from” wide-ranging “disease presenting early in 
childhood to” an indolent or sometimes “asymptomatic disorder discovered unexpectedly in 
elderly adults” (Rosenbaum, 2015). Also, as mentioned before, successful treatment with 
enzyme replacement therapy should enable a Gaucher patient to have a complete and fulfilled 
life, thus assisting him or her to reaching his or her full potential as an individual, and making 
a meaningful contribution to society (Masek, 1999, p. 263) (Weinreb N. , 2002, p. 112) 
(Hayes, 1998, p. 521). 
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Genetic testing may supply insurance companies and employers the ability to screen people 
to determine their dispositions for certain diseases. This could lead to inflated premiums and 
discrimination. Insurance companies will most probably also be more averse to accept a 
patient with Gaucher disease or even an individual with the probability of inheriting the 
disease genetically. Insurance rates might be increased dramatically or coverage might be 
denied altogether (Guttmacher, 2003, p. 562). Therefore, a breach in confidentiality regarding 
the results of genetic screening information may directly violate the rights of affected 
individuals (ACOG, 2008 (Reaffirmed 2014), p. 6).  This kind of discrimination against 
individuals directly opposes Rawls’ theory of justice which particularly underscores justice 
and fairness of a democratic and free society, thereby ensuring equality for all citizens 
regardless of their situation (Boldt, 2011, p. 216).  
 
Genetic screening may not give exact information since the disease course of Gaucher type 1 
disease could be unpredictable. Because genetic testing may not supply sufficiently 
comprehensive information to a patient and the family, these tests may consequently 
necessitate complex moral decision making. This can lead to uncertainties for both physicians 
and patients.  
For parents like Mrs. X and her husband, this situation could create an “ethical dilemma” 
entailing the difficult choice of whether “to continue or end the pregnancy without having 
proper knowledge of the severity of the disorder” (Lea, 2005, p. 238). This will be further 
addressed in the next session.    
 
3. Abortion 
3.1 Abortion on medical grounds and ethical theory 
 
Another possible ethical dilemma could be whether, depending on the disease severity, the 
baby should be aborted or not.  
 
In the fictional case study described in Chapter 1, Mrs. X has been diagnosed with Gaucher 
disease and the biological father, after proper counselling and informed consent procedures 
were followed, was subsequently tested and found to be a carrier for Gaucher disease.  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
66 
 
Thus, the likelihood of the baby affected with Gaucher disease is extremely high – 50%. The 
family thus has to decide whether abortion should be weighed as an option (refer to figure 1 
in Chapter 1: “Inheriting Gaucher Disease”).  
 
Gaucher disease can be diagnosed as early as between Week 18 and 20 of gestation. This is 
the time period where the embryo grows into a fetus (non-viable) and late-term (viable). This 
is border line on whether maternal discretion or the fetus’ best interest must be used as a 
determining factor to decide to terminate the pregnancy. In South Africa, the “Choice of 
Termination of Pregnancy Act (Act 92 of 1996)” is extremely liberal. This act declares that in 
South Africa, “any woman of any age can get an abortion by simply requesting with no 
reasons given if she is less than 13 weeks pregnant. If she is between 13 and 20 weeks 
pregnant, she can get the abortion if (a) her own physical or mental health is at stake, (b) the 
baby will have severe mental or physical abnormalities, (c) she is pregnant because of incest, 
(d) she is pregnant because of rape, or (e) she is of the personal opinion that her economic or 
social situation is sufficient reason for the termination of pregnancy. If she is more than 20 
weeks pregnant, she can get the abortion only if the mother or the fetus' life is in danger or 
there are likely to be serious birth defects” (GovernmentGazette, 2008). Furthermore, the 
South African Constitution underscores every citizen’s human right. In fact, the “Bill of 
Rights” states: "Everyone has the right to bodily and psychological integrity, which includes 
the right [...] to make decisions concerning reproduction," though section 27(1)(a) declares 
that "Everyone has the right to have access to [...] health care services, including reproductive 
health care." 
 
Giannubilo et al hold that “signs and symptoms of Gaucher disease may have” a possible 
detrimental influence on both “pregnancy and birth” (Giannubilo, 2015, p. 54).  In particular, 
massive hepatosplenomegaly may alter normal growth of a fetus during pregnancy. In 
addition, complications exacerbated during pregnancy, including anaemia and 
thrombocytopenia may unfavourably influence the patient’s haemostatic profile and even 
increase the patient’s bleeding tendency. This may become critical during birth. The author 
mentions that pregnancy may also adversely “affect the course of Gaucher disease” 
(Giannubilo, 2015, p. 54), increasing current “signs and symptoms as well as the possibility 
of triggering new features, for example bone pains” (Giannubilo, 2015, p. 54). Conversely, 
Gaucher disease is a treatable disorder. With proper enzyme replacement treatment strategies 
in place, the patient can have an extremely productive life, both socially and economically. 
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Thus, if both the mother and the father do not have a severe mutation to Gaucher disease, one 
can even wait until the baby is born before genotyping takes place.  
 
As previously mentioned, in the current scenario, the mother has Gaucher disease and the 
father is a carrier.  Thus, the baby has a 50% chance of being diagnosed with Gaucher 
disease. With regards to abortion, severe genetic abnormalities pose limited ethical 
difficulties. Though additional challenging concerns may ensue when the course of the 
disease is erratic or “unpredictable” and “when the disease is moderate” (Gross, 2002). 
“While the severity of type 1 Gaucher disease varies substantially and treatment is available, 
some prospective parents remain cautious about carrying a genetically affected fetus to term” 
(Gross, 2002, p. 152).  While the test for genetic screening of Gaucher disease is simple, 
accurate and sensitive, it does not predict disease prognosis or severity of clinical 
manifestations.  
 
In After Virtue, Alasdair MacIntyre is of the notion that “both predictability and 
unpredictability are crucial aspects of human life” (MacIntyre, 1984, p. 104). He held that 
“for a degree of social structure and regularity” it is essential “to engage in the long-term 
projects and planning which make life meaningful, while a degree of unpredictability is 
required for us to be in possession of ourselves and not merely to be the creations of other 
people’s projects” (MacIntyre, 1984, p. 104). 
   
I contend that maybe we should not only be fascinated with the notion of predictability or 
non-predictability (genetic testing) of the future traits of a person (e.g. a person’s propensity 
to have Gaucher disease), but rather regard the person holistically with regards to potential 
and look at their future traits pertaining to possible societal and economic benefits as a human 
being in entirety. Many Gaucher patients have the potential to be highly functional 
individuals particularly if they are diagnosed early and have adequate access to enzyme 
replacement therapy are treated timeously and thus have the capacity to live quite happy and 
fulfilled lives whilst making major economic and societal contributions (Masek, 1999, p. 
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Should a mother decide to abort her fetus earlier than the third trimester, her decisions could 
be guided by using wisdom, exercising good judgement and acting with care and thought for 
the future. However, maternal discretion to abort during the further progression or later on in 
the pregnancy is normally insufficient both morally as well as ethically to provide sufficient 
justification. Fetal interest should also be taken into consideration. The expectation of 
delivering an infant with a chronic, incapacitating and devastating genetic disease generally 
supplies adequate reason for abortion, however, the contexts unique to Gaucher disease could 
overturn any forthright conclusions (Gross, 2002).  
 
According to Gross et al, when the disease is treatable, fetal best interests may actually 
mitigate against abortion. Therefore, the notion of abortion of fetuses “afflicted with Gaucher 
disease or any similar genetic illness” may present more challenges than initially anticipated 
(Gross, 2002, p. 159). 
 
A utilitarian approach generally underscores justification for selective abortion. As 
previously discussed, from a moral perspective, utilitarianism considers the reasonable 
“consequences which may arise from a particular action” (Graham, 2004). Should a mother 
decide to terminate a pregnancy due to concerns regarding carrying a fetus with an 
impairment to term, such a decision would be influenced by the utilitarian approach to moral 
reasoning.  
 
Lea et al mention the example of a baby born with impairment with the prospects of a “less 
than optimal life” that would possibly “create a great burden to the parents and society” alike 
(Lea, 2005, p. 234). In this instance, according to utilitarian principles, it might be better if 
the baby dies. In reality, ethical circumstances often deal with conflicting values. Although 
the appropriate action may not always seem well-defined, the direction the medical action 
must take is evident. There is no strong differentiator between “right” and “wrong” when 
looking at ethical dilemmas. Both the values and wishes of everyone involved should be 
taken into account when choosing the best possible outcome. When analyzing this situation, 
careful thought and consideration of all the influencing factors must be considered. Davis et 
al argue that utilitarianism is in stark contrast with medical ethics. Davis quotes the example 
that most hospitals have “a renal dialysis unit for kidney transplants” which could potentially 
have devastating consequences for healthcare services (Davis, 1997, p. 57).  
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Davis therefore holds that the principle of justice be added to the “principle of utility” when 
making “ethical decisions about how widely the good” should “be distributed throughout 
society” (Davis, 1997, p. 57). Also, subscribing to utilitarianism, this may indicate that even 
though the “greatest number” of people is happy, this could be to the detriment of “the 
minority” (Davis, 1997, p. 57).  
 
Reflection for selective abortion and hence determining morality of this practice from a 
utilitarian perspective, commonly make reference to the following individual’s welfare and 
interests, the fetus (who may be a future individual), the possible next child who may not be 
conceived due to the parents pre-conceived conception of disease repetition. Lastly society, 
particularly with reference to the extra financial resources needed to look after and treat a 
child afflicted with a disability or a hereditary genetic disease (Kushe, 1985, p. 155).  
 
Due to financial pressures, other family’s needs and other circumstances justifying the 
hedonistic calculus, a utilitarian may question whether an abortion may bring about more 
happiness for the greatest number of people. Utilitarianism thus mostly pivots around indirect 
consequences to a greater number of people and not on the positive or negative effects of the 
proposed act which is ultimately directly related to the individual who will in this instance be 
directly affected by the act.  When considering utilitarianism, it is absolutely impossible to 
rely on general outright recommendations, since every single case consists of its own 
pertinent relevant features and therefore should be evaluated on an individual basis, taking 
into consideration numerous factors.  A more important principal to consider in this context 
which will be described in the next section would be autonomy. 
 
 
3.2 Abortion on medical grounds and autonomy 
 
Generally, the scientific community and society as a whole might not be averse to defend a 
women’s right to decide to abort a fetus with debilitating genetic defects. Autonomy of the 
mother is regarded as an imperative principle of bioethics. “Immanuel Kant” held that a 
person has free will and choice and is thus responsible for his/her own actions, acting in 
accordance with one's true self, i.e., one's rational will (Morgan, 2001, pp. 87, 88).  
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The “duty to respect others’ autonomy” reigns supreme “in virtually all ethical situations” 
(Lea, 2005, p. 235).  The word “autonomy” is derived from Greek word “autonomos”, 
meaning “self-rule” which renders this principle to apply to the rights and interests of 
individuals  (Hewson, 2001, p. ii10) (Beauchamp, 2014, p. 23).   
 
According to Lea et al, autonomy dictates that decisions should be voluntary and “free from 
coercion” (Lea, 2005, p. 235). According to Petchesky et al, one of the foremost creeds of 
feminist belief is “that women have a fundamental right to” autonomy and “bodily integrity” 
(Petchesky, 1986). This unequivocally encompasses “the right to terminate an unwanted 
pregnancy” (Petchesky, 1986). “The Liberal Theory of Abortion” emphasises the “freedom 
of choice”, as well as “the right of a woman to make decisions that affect her body” 
(Beauchamp, 2014, p. 240).  
 
Denbow holds that for pregnant women, respecting autonomy does not always mean 
capitalizing on a range of options. There are numerous factors that need to be considered to 
show consideration for a woman’s reproductive independence of choice and self-
determination, for instance: societal stigmas, resources available, welfare laws and healthcare 
systems (Denbow, 2013, p. 228). Should the option of abortion not be available in the 
instance of high-cost disease, the uncertain future might place almost insurmountable 
financial and emotional burdens that may in turn put the mother at a significant social and 
economic disadvantage. Thus, being an autonomous being, should the mother after careful 
consideration and consultation decide to abort the baby in this instance? I believe that it 
would not be morally wrong for the mother to abort the cells that are currently called “fetus”.  
 
South Africa has legalized abortion and in terms of the “Choice of Termination of Pregnancy 
Act (Act 92 of 1996)” (GovernmentGazette, 2008), the mother, being 12 weeks pregnant at 
this stage, is totally within her legal and ethically autonomous rights to request an abortion at 
less than 13 weeks without describing in any particular detail what the motives were behind 
her decision.  
 
If the mother decides to abort, she will never know whether the baby she aborted indeed 
would have acquired Gaucher disease. Throughout history, the fundamental world view 
underlying science has been Newtonian. Epistemologically, Newtonian science holds the 
promise of comprehensive, objective, clear and assured knowledge of past and future. 
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Conversely, this bygone notion disregards any alternative idea, depicting value, ethics, or 
creative processes, applying a designation of almost an intricate “clockwork mechanism” to 
the universe (Heylighen, 2007). However, recently, various scientific developments have 
contested this one-dimensional picture, pointing towards a much more complex scenario. 
Cilliers and Heylighen hold that our scientific knowledge of the world is fundamentally 
uncertain, complex and unpredictable (Cilliers, 1998) (Heylighen, 2007, p. 131). Thus, 
sometimes we have to cope with uncertainty when dealing with the most profound and 
important issues in life, and although we find ourselves in unknown territory or spaces of 
moral exception, analytical complexity should be embraced.  
 
Houle holds that abortion debates have stagnated because in her opinion, ethicists tend to 
work with caricatures of multifaceted phenomena, relying on rules of reason to represent 
positions that cannot be articulated or explained in logical arguments thereby revealing the 
utmost complexity of the moral character of abortion (Houle, 2013). According to Houle, we 
should also consider “spaces of exception” (Houle, 2013). At that stage, the mother will most 
certainly do the best with the facts that she has access to. Thus, we might never have a clear 
answer or conclusion in this ongoing debate. 
 
Some contend that abortion is never acceptable and therefore religious and cultural beliefs 
and stigma of the community should be considered, as well as the expected influence/damage 
to the family as a whole. This is commonly called the Conservative Theory of Abortion and 
often a common belief amongst Roman Catholics, but they are by no means its only 
advocates (Beauchamp, 2014, p. 240). Obviously, the deliberation will include the mother’s 
degree of autonomy and the rights of the fetus itself. Consideration should be given to 
provide information and guidance in a non-paternalistic and sensitive manner, anticipating 
that the mother will find her own answers, confident that she has ultimately made the right 
choice.   
 
One of the important notions of contemporary utilitarianism and pertinent to the bioethical 
argument of abortion particular to the fetus, is the concept of personhood (Singer, 1993). 
According to Tooley et al, “a person is a being who is self-aware” and has the capacity to 
understand that there is an opportunity or possibility of “continuing the self” (Tooley, 1972, 
p. 40).  
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Locke defined a person as a being capable of reflection, aware of being in different times and 
places and thus, due to awareness, could potentially be deprived of a continued existence 
(Kushe, 1985, p. 132). 
  
Human life is always considered precious. Baganini et al held that “life is intrinsically 
valuable in and of itself” and that “existence usually sustains a conscious personal life” with 
“life projects, personal values and metaphysical beliefs” (Baganini, 2012, p. 91). However, 
although no one contests that a fetus is alive and that it has numerous possibilities and 
ambitions left unfulfilled, I agree with Baganini that “it gradually acquires the characteristics 
that give it such value” (Baganini, 2012, p. 94).  
 
Finally, tremendous financial strain ascribed to the high costs of medical care, mostly long-
term, could be accrued from raising a child with especially bone impairments due to Gaucher 
disease. This may exhaust the family’s resources, compromising the family as a whole. Thus, 
should the mother, decide to keep the baby and he/she is diagnosed with Gaucher disease, 
early treatment initiation is imperative to avert debilitating adverse effects of the disease 
(Masek, 1999, p. 263) (Weinreb N. , 2002, p. 112) (Hayes, 1998, p. 521). In this way, with 
both baby and mother treated, both can function optimally and contribute successfully to 
society and hence can become important economic and social contributors (Masek, 1999, p. 
264).  
 
Accepting a lack of answers is always extremely difficult because surely there has to be a 
way to handle ethical dilemmas like this. In order to handle such a dilemma, one should try to 
consider weighing up all moral principles one by one and apply which is most applicable to 
the current case and individuals in question. The solution might involve careful consideration 
and reflection. The final choice lies with the particular individuals and their families in 
question and if given proper attention to what really matters, and is of value to them, with 
proper responsibility the essence of what morality really is, might get to a deserving and 
worthwhile conclusion. 
Increasingly apparent from the previous section (as discussed in the Case Study) is that the 
mother, (Mrs. X), just recently diagnosed with Gaucher Type 1 (a rare disease), will be faced 
with a life-threatening disease with implications for the fetus and will need to make some 
ethical choices on behalf of herself and the fetus (See figure 3.2 below on next page). 
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Figure 3.2: Possible choices of a female patient with Gaucher type 1:  
Not yet pregnant 
Gaucher type 1 
patient 
 




Not Yet Pregnant Patient 
carrying Gaucher type 1 
Gene 
 
↓ ↓ ↓ 
No children Metabolic screening Pre-Screening Diagnosis 
↓ ↓ ↓ 
Choices: In vitro 
fertilization (IVF) 
with metabolic 
screening of embryos 
or Adopt 
Choices: Abort or Diagnose: 
Treatment with ERT* or no ERT  
Choices: Genetic 
manipulation/Diagnosed: 
Treatment with ERT or no ERT 
*ERT: Enzyme replacement therapy 
 
These ethical choices are not unique, and are typically associated with numerous other 
genetically inherited rare diseases. My intention with this particular thesis, however, is to 
concentrate predominantly on the following four ethical issues relating to Gaucher disease, 
namely genetic screening/testing, disclosure of genetic information, abortion as well as 
resource allocation.  
 
In conclusion, in addition to uncertainties and complexities associated with some 
contemporary ethical dilemmas like genetics and selective abortion, there can be no doubt 
that we currently live in the golden age which opens up a Pandora’s Box of possibilities, 
offering a plethora of opportunities for genetic testing, and hence diagnosis and therapy of 
rare and chronic genetic disorders such as Gaucher disease. By placing within human power 
the ability to possibly “foresee” future consequences as well as to have the opportunity of 
changing the outlook of a disease, previously regarded as given and unchangeable (in our 
destiny), compels us to reconsider traditional boundaries between injustice and the hand we 
are dealt. However, this also brings about a range of moral and ethical dilemmas, demanding 
careful consideration and reflection. I hold that we should maybe use this opportunity of a 
deepened understanding of genetic issues to contribute to an appreciation of the wealth of 
human diversity and the vast untapped potential inherent in each of us. 
 
 







Limited awareness of rare diseases amongst a wider scope of healthcare professionals, as well 
as limited numbers of geneticists and genetic counsellors are only some of the challenges 
patients with rare diseases are currently facing in South Africa. As previously discussed, the 
limited prevalence precludes prioritization of rare diseases for national health programs. 
Hence, innovative approaches are needed to increase current awareness and to broaden the 
current scope of knowledge expertise.  
 
We can certainly learn a lot from the European Commission of Public Health’s combined 
efforts to develop “European Centres of Excellence” and “European Reference Networks for 
rare diseases” (ECPH, 2014).  It would be difficult to compete with this sphere of healthcare 
“where collaboration between 27 different national approaches” is well-organised, and highly 
resourceful (Baldovino, 2016, p. 359). This European Union task force endeavours to: render 
“rare diseases more visible by developing proper identification and coding to increase 
diagnosis”, encouraging EU “member states to develop national rare diseases” health policy 
initiatives to “ensure equal access to prevention, diagnosis, treatment and rehabilitation” and 
“providing European support and cooperation, such as ensuring that common policy 
guidelines are developed and shared” throughout Europe “in specific areas” including 
“research, centres of expertise, access to information, orphan medicines, and screening” 
(ECPH, 2014). 
 
In the light of all the previous gathered data, my take on the matter is that one could for 
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3.1 Patient treatment access 
 
 Since Gaucher disease, is a chronic disease, the patient will be on enzyme replacement 
therapy lifelong. Thus, sometimes, the only chance to enter or enrol in a treatment 
program is when a patient deteriorates. I thus propose a rare diseases treatment waiting 
list, similar to waiting lists for organ transplants (taking into account medical criteria 
dependent on prognosis/survival rate, co-morbidities, age/life-expectancy) (Bloom, 
1987). A proposal is that an advisory board consisting of treating physicians and other 
important stakeholders could be formed who will adjudicate which patients might be 
eligible based on urgency of treatment, clinical signs and symptoms as well as how life-
threatening the patient’s disease is. 
 Thoughts might even be given to a “Rare Diseases National Lottery” which might give all 
patients with a rare disease an equal opportunity to participate (Brock, 2006, p. 264).  
 
3.2 Disease advocates 
 More resources should be made available for rare diseases patient support groups like 
Gaucher Society South Africa (www.gaucherssa.co.za) and “Rare Diseases South Africa” 
(http://www.rarediseases.co.za). Patient support groups form an extensive network where 
patients and relatives with rare genetic diseases can safely associate, communicate and 
impart and share critical experiences, whilst discovering useful and valuable information 
and resources. There is a minority voice behind rare diseases in South Africa, which is 
not strong enough, and it is precisely therefore that this debate needs to take place. 
 
3.3 Research 
 Lack of research related to rare diseases seems to be a global problem, since recent results 
from the Rare Diseases Organisation in the UK (RDUK) reveals  dissatisfaction with 
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Thus, I suggest increased or ‘ring fenced’ funding for more research into rare diseases. In 
South Africa, there is a need for more rare disease registries. This will assist with recording 
the number of affected patients, monitoring the amount and severity of symptoms as well as 
documenting the natural history of the disease. Moreover, these initiatives will also enhance 
the visibility to Gaucher disease patients and elucidate their daily needs and problems. This 
may ultimately accelerate research and development of novel rare disease treatments and 
enhance drug access and reimbursement through medical aids in South Africa.  
 
3.4 Funding 
 I propose that a pool of money from the annual National Health Budget in South Africa 
be allocated specifically to help patients with rare diseases in South Africa (Brock, 2006, 
p. 264). This budget should increase yearly. There are many examples of health funding 
globally. In certain countries, some clinical conditions already have centralized funding 
structures in place. In France, certain high-cost medicine is accessible via specific centres 
“who receive funding support” (Hughes D. , 2005, p. 834). The Netherlands are very pro-
active in the sense that costly “licensed orphan drugs” are added to a list which permits 
prescription by academic hospitals. Ninety-five percent of these costs are reimbursed by 
Ministry of Health and 5% from hospital budget (Hughes D. , 2005, p. 834). A pertinent 
example of resource allocation to Gaucher disease is the newly created Health Fund of 
Macedonia which since the end of 2016 treats patients with Gaucher disease (Gucev, 
2015, p. 151).  
 
3.5 Education 
 Training more healthcare professionals to identify and diagnose rare diseases is an 
important initiative that needs more attention. Multidisciplinary academic rare disease 
workshops may be held including various disease specialities, amongst others, geneticists, 
paediatricians, physicians, haematologists, endocrinologists and surgeons.  
 
The aim would also be to ultimately create specialised disease centres which in itself 
would generate more publicity. Also, perhaps more emphasis should be placed to include 
rare diseases in curriculums of certain disease specialities to enhance earlier diagnosis and 
to create a larger pool of rare disease experts.  
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 There is also a need for augmented online Continuing Medical Education (CME) 
platforms, focusing exclusively on rare diseases. In addition, novel technologies, such as 
telemedicine or web based platforms that increase interconnectivity between rare disease 




 The publicity behind AIDS and tuberculosis is extremely high. However, rare diseases 
receive far less publicity (Kling, 2013, p. 95). Publicity for rare diseases can be increased 
through the platforms of various rare diseases societies and with funding from other 
stakeholders with vested interests. Herewith a few pertinent examples: 
o Increased public rare disease awareness may be created by launching campaigns 
including posters and patient information leaflets in doctor’s waiting rooms and at 
well-attended popular public events as well as by inviting rare disease experts to 
host expert talks on radio stations. 
o Improved awareness can also be created by travelling rare disease ambassadors, 
not only in South Africa, but also globally, to share their stories with yet 
undiagnosed family members or newly diagnosed patients.  
 
 
Obviously, the above examples would need to comply with the current guidelines of the 
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3.7 Final recommendations: 
 
My conclusion, with regards to this case study in particular, is that since untreated female 
patients with Gaucher disease are at a significant risk of recurrent fetal loss, I would, after 
careful consultation and informed consent, recommend treatment for the pregnant lady 
involved. In this instance the pregnant patient after comprehensive and careful consultation 
did reveal her diagnosis to her spouse, who was subsequently also tested. His test results 
showed him to be a carrier of Gaucher disease. Because the needs of families with individuals 
with rare diseases cannot be emphasised enough, I would also recommend psychological care 
in addition to sufficient information to make informed decisions. Reality-orientated 
counselling should take place at all stages of the process with a physician well versed in the 
pathophysiology and treatment of Gaucher Type 1 disease. The patients’ best interests should 
always be top of mind. The cost to a family of watching a child suffer for years before dying 
is incalculable.  
 
Thus, with regards to allocation of treatment for rare diseases and in particular type 1 
Gaucher disease, more efforts should be made towards access to enzyme replacement therapy 
for most, if not all patients through innovative initiatives. Reimbursement of treatment of rare 
diseases invariably creates immeasurable conflicts between the claims of society versus 
individuals. My view is that while the numerous ethical theories and reflection may not 
provide a clear answer to every possible ethical dilemma, they may, however, afford the 
necessary elucidation in terms of context and structure.  
 
Each and every ethical theory gives a different perspective or brings some valid point to the 
fore, giving us diverse views and means and moral applications. None is perfect. And will 
never be. We are all, after all, only human. If, however, we endeavor to do the best in the 
circumstances with the most facts in hand, we cannot stray too far from the moral path. We 
need to try to incorporate the most sound and most suitable solution according to our best 
intentions whilst being true to others and ourselves.  
 
Ethics is complex and can in no manner, whatsoever, be adequately addressed by any set of 
imperfect rules, formulas or precise theories. Every single case we will ever be dealing with 
is different. Therefore, ethics require from us unprejudiced, open-minded consideration of 
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each individual patient’s interests. A suggestion would be even closer scrutiny of costs 
associated with rare diseases to assist funders to ascertain proportion of resources needed to 
accommodate rare diseases within the healthcare realm versus other more commonly 
encountered diseases. It is my view that it is important to make some cost comparisons 
between low prevalence rare diseases with other high prevalence disorders receiving larger 
allocations in South Africa’s National Health Budget. Maybe a revised framework with 
greater inclusion for rare diseases like the ethical framework previously alluded to and 
proposed by Pinxten et al is required for decision making and distribution of healthcare 
resources (Pinxten, 2012, p. 148).  
 
Finally, many ethical dilemmas can be extremely acute and complex with no universal 
practices that can settle these issues. Every patient has an explicit and inherent right to life, 
opportunity and realization of potential but this can be in conflict with justice in the scenario 
of limited resources.  
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